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I.

INTRODUCTION

The statutory scheme for capital punishment in Washington
State' vests local county prosecuting attorneys with the power to
seek the execution of murderers in certain circumstances. But
nothing requires prosecutors to seek capital punishment. The
choice is theirs and theirs alone. No judge may compel a prosecutor to seek death. Alternatively, no judge may prevent a prosecutor who wishes to seek the death penalty from doing so. And
given the demise of the grand jury, there is no check at all
against overzealous prosecutorial decisions to seek death. While
a jury may ultimately refuse to authorize capital punishment,
the prosecutor alone has the power to trigger the process of forcing defendants to run the gauntlet of a death penalty trial.
This awesome power granted to Washington county prosecutors is not only unchecked by any other institution, it is
unguided by any set of meaningful standards. Prosecutors are
authorized-but not required-to seek death in cases of aggravated first degree murder where there is "reason to believe that
there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency."' But the legislature has not said what constitutes a miti*Staff Attorney, Washington Appellate Defender; former King County Deputy Prosecutor. B.A., 1974, Stanford University; M.A., 1975, Stanford University; J.D., 1978,
Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
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1. If a person is charged with aggravated first degree murder as defined by
RCW 10.95.020, the prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of a special
sentencing proceeding to determine whether the death penalty should be
imposed when there is reason to believe that there are not sufficient mitigating
circumstances to merit leniency.
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040(1) (1981).
2. Id.
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gating circumstance, nor how many such circumstances are "sufficient" for leniency, nor whether some mitigating circumstances
are more meritorious than others. Every county prosecutor in
the state is left to decide these issues based upon his or her own
moral philosophy and conscientious principles.
Perhaps no other legislative mandate delegates so much
power, in a manner so unchecked and unguided by standards or
definitions, than this legislative decision to anoint county prosecutors as individual guardians of the moral conscience of our
local communities. The legislature has given prosecutors unfettered power to request executions, or not to request executions,
as they alone see fit.
This Article advances six reasons why Washington's statutory scheme for capital punishment should be deemed unconstitutional. As set forth below, the current death penalty statutes
violate the separation of powers doctrine, the grand jury indictment clause of the fifth amendment, the equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment and article I, section 12 of the
Washington State Constitution, the vagueness doctrine of the
due process clause, and the doctrine of unlawful delegation of
legislative power. Finally, it promotes an unequal administration
of capital punishment in further violation of the guarantee of
equal protection of the law.
II.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that "[t]he separation of powers doctrine is a fundamental principle of the American political system."' It has not hesitated to
rigorously enforce the separation of powers doctrine where one
branch of government has intruded upon the province of
another.4 The supreme court has traced the history of the doc3. Hagan & Van Camp, P.S. v. Kessler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 443, 453, 635 P.2d
730, 736 (1981). Article I, § 32 of the Washington State Constitution provides: "A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual right
and the perpetuity of free government."
4. The legislative, executive, and judicial functions have been carefully separated and, notwithstanding the opinions of a certain class of our society to the
contrary, the courts have ever been alert and resolute to keep these functions
properly separated. To this is assuredly due the steady equilibrium of our triune governmental system. The courts are jealous of their own prerogatives and,
at the same time, studiously careful and sedulously determined that neither
the executive nor legislative department shall usurp the powers of the other, or
of the courts.
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trine back to the eighteenth century, noting that the interrelated
concepts of separation of powers, checks and balances, and
inherent judicial power, "are major constituents of our governmental framework."' The philosophers of the Enlightenment
era, John Locke, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, and
Baron de Montesquieu "were influential proponents of their
individual versions of the doctrine." By 1776, the separation of
powers doctrine "was being advanced as the only coherent constitutional theory upon which an alternative to colonial forms of
government could be based."'7
While the doctrine is perhaps best known in its national
context, "[t]he constitutions of several states, inheritors of the
federal constitutional legacy, also embody the principle."8 The
Washington Supreme Court has twice recognized that under
some circumstances, in order to preserve judicial independence
and the continued vitality of the separation of powers doctrine,
courts may, upon clear and cogent proof of a need for additional
financial resources, compel the legislature to authorize the
expenditure of public funds necessary for the operation of the
judicial system.9 "Separation of powers . . . dictates that the
judiciary be able to insure its own survival when insufficient
Kastler, 96 Wash. 2d at 453, 635 P.2d at 736 (quoting In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 478,
172 P. 1132, 1154 (1918)).
5. In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 238, 552 P.2d 163, 167 (1976).
6. Id. at 238, 552 P.2d at 167.
7. Id. at 239, 552 P.2d at 167-68.
8. Id. at 240, 552 P.2d at 168.
The doctrine of separation of powers is not confined to the federal constitution. As noted by Justice William 0. Douglas in The Anatomy of Liberty, The
Rights of Man Without Force (1963), at page 54:
Six of the original states explicitly affirmed the doctrine of the
separation of powers. Today the theory is formally announced in
about forty state constitutions. The other states make no such formal
declaration; nor does the Constitution of the United States. Yet the
same result is reached because these other states' constitutions, as
the federal constitution, create three departments of government,
vesting the executive power in one, the legislative power in another,
and the judicial power in a third.
Washington is among those states which recognize the separation of powers
theory in its constitution by vesting the "judicial power of the state" in a separate branch of government. Const. art. 4 § 1....
We have recognized and
applied the doctrine of separation of powers in Besselman v. Moses Lake, 46
Wn.2d 279, 280 P.2d 689 (1955), and Tacoma v. O'Brien, 85 Wash. 2d 266, 534
P.2d 114 (1975).
Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 754, 539 P.2d 823, 829 (1975).
9. In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d at 245-52, 552 P.2d at 170-75.
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funds are provided by the other branches."'1 0 The court has forbidden the legislature to make adjudicatory decisions on legal
issues such as what constitutes "economic impossibility.""
Applying the separation of powers doctrine, the court
recently held unconstitutional a statute which purported to
allow escrow agents to prepare documents for real estate transactions as an encroachment on the judicial function of regulating
the practice of law."' Most importantly, the court held unconstitutional a statute which granted prosecuting attorneys the power
to veto a deferred prosecution as an encroachment upon the
judicial function of sentencing.'8
A legislative scheme which grants the prosecutor a veto
power over the applicability of the death penalty violates the
doctrine of separation of powers by unconstitutionally usurping
the judicial sentencing function. The current statutory scheme
provides that upon conviction of aggravated first degree murder,
a special sentencing proceeding to consider the imposition of the
death penalty "shall be held if a notice of special sentencing
proceeding was filed and served as provided by RCW [Revised
Code of Washington] 10.95.040."" The legislature has thus
made the act of the prosecutor in filing the notice a mandatory
prerequisite for any death penalty proceeding. Without the filing
of such a notice, the court is powerless to consider imposing a
sentence of death.
This legislative scheme is similar to the scheme struck down
5
as unconstitutional in State v. Cascade District Court.1 In Cascade, the court examined RCW 10.05,1

which provides for

deferred prosecution in courts of limited jurisdiction where the
accused's criminal conduct is caused by alcohol, drug, or mental
problems for which the defendant is in need of treatment. A
defendant who wishes to obtain a deferred prosecution treat17
ment program must file a petition at the time of arraignment.
RCW 10.05.030 then purports to grant the prosecuting attorney
10. Id. at 245, 552 P.2d at 170-71.
11. O'Brien, 85 Wash. 2d at 272, 534 P.2d at 117. See also Plummer v. Gaines, 70
Wash. 2d 53, 58, 422 P.2d 17, 21 (1966) (defining what constitutes a "general election").
12. Kassler, 96 Wash. 2d at 453, 635 P.2d at 736.
13. State v. Cascade Dist. Ct., 94 Wash. 2d 772, 779-82, 621 P.2d 115, 118-21 (1981).
14. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.050 (1981) (emphasis added).
15. 94 Wash. 2d 772, 621 P.2d 115 (1981).
16. WASH. Rzv. CODE § 10.05.020 (1981).
17. Id. § 10.05.010.
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the power to veto any further action on the petition. 8 According
to the legislative scheme, if the prosecutor agrees to a diagnostic
referral and evaluation, the defendant may subsequently submit
a proposed treatment plan to the court for the court's
approval.19
In Cascade, the prosecution conceded that "the decision to
defer prosecution following an evaluation and written report is
entirely a judicialfunction.' 's But the state contended that the
decision whether to continue arraignment and refer the accused
for a diagnostic evaluation was not a judicial function. The
supreme court's inquiry thus focused on whether the decision to
refer for evaluation was "essentially judicial or prosecutorial,
and if wholly or partially judicial, whether the prosecution may
exercise a 'veto' over the court's decision.""'
After reviewing various statements of legislative purpose,
the Cascade court concluded "that the decision to refer an
accused for a diagnostic evaluation is essentially a sentencing
alternative and therefore at least partially a judicial act."" The
court emphasized that the decision to approve the sentencing
alternative of a deferred prosecution "involves an examination
of the circumstances of the particular case, weighing of the allegations, hearing argument contrary to the petition, and resolving
the disputes between the parties. These are fundamentally
23
judicial acts.'
The state argued that vesting the court with the authority
to initiate consideration of a deferred prosecution invaded the
charging function traditionally reserved to the prosecuting attorney. Recognizing that a deferred prosecution was a sentencing
(or "dispositional") alternative, the court rejected the state's
argument, noting that "[tihis contention overlooks the fact that
the court's disposition of the petition follows the prosecutor's
decision to charge; once the accused has been charged and is
18. "The arraigning judge upon consideration of the petition and with the concurrence of the prosecuting attorney may continue the arraignment and refer such person

for a diagnostic investigation and evaluation to an approved alcohol treatment facility..

.

."

Id. § 10.05.030 (emphasis added).

19. Id. §§ 10.05.040-.060.
20. 94 Wash. 2d at 776, 621 P.2d at 118 (emphasis in original deleted) (emphasis

added).

21. Id. at 775, 621 P.2d at 117.
22. Id. at 777, 621 P.2d at 118 (emphasis in original).
23. Id. at 777-78, 621 P.2d at 118-19 (emphasis added).
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24
before the court, the charging function ceases."
Having concluded that consideration of a deferred prosecution petition was essentially a judicial function, the Cascade
court then observed that by making the concurrence of the prosecutor a prerequisite for approval of the petition, "the statute
permits a prosecutor to wholly arbitrarily veto a judicial disposition. '2 5 By granting the executive branch of government a complete veto over the exercise of a judicial function, the statute was
26
deemed to violate the separation of powers doctrine.
The statute at issue here, RCW 10.95.040,27 is fatally flawed
in the same manner as the statute struck down in Cascade. It
too grants the prosecutor an arbitrary veto power over the availability of a sentencing alternative. Like the filing of the petition
for a deferred prosecution, the filing of notice of a special sentencing proceeding "follows the prosecutor's decision to
charge."' 28 Once one accused of aggravated first degree murder
and brought before the court, the charging
"has been charged
29
ceases.
function
In Cascade, the veto power conferred upon the prosecution
permitted the state to prevent judicial consideration of a lenient
sentencing alternative which defendants would generally prefer
to other, harsher alternatives. The veto power under the present
death penalty statute permits the state to prevent judicial consideration of the most severe sentencing alternative-death-which defendants nearly always would prefer to
avoid. But the principle of separation of powers is violated in
both cases.
Several decisions of the California Supreme Court also hold
that statutes authorizing a prosecutor to preclude a sentencing
alternative by withholding his consent violate the separation of
0
powers doctrine of the California State Constitution. In People
v. Tenorio,81 the court held that a statute denying the trial judge
the discretion to dismiss certain charges under the Health and

24. Id. at 778, 621 P.2d at 119 (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 781, 621 P.2d at 120.
26. "Since the statute permits the prosecutor to arbitrarily
decision of the courts, we strike as unconstitutional that portion of
requires the prosecutor's consent." Id.
27. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.040 (1981). See also infra note
28. Cascade, 94 Wash. 2d at 778, 621 P.2d at 119 (emphasis
29. Id.

30. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 1.

31. 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970).

'veto' a discretionary
RCW 10.05.030 which
1.
in original).
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Safety Code, except on motion of the prosecuting attorney, constituted an invasion of the separation of powers provision of the
state constitution. The Tenorio court stated: "When the decision
to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal
or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature." 2
In Esteybar v. Municipal Court,5 the court struck down a
statute requiring the prosecutor's consent before a magistrate
could determine that an offense be tried as a misdemeanor on
the ground that it violated the separation of powers doctrine." '
The court held that since the magistrate's decision followed the
decision to prosecute, the act was judicial in nature and did not
interfere with the charging process.
Finally, in People v. Superior Court,3 the California
Supreme Court held that once the jurisdiction of a court has
been properly invoked by the filing of a criminal charge, the disposition of that charge becomes a judicial responsibility.3 7 The
court invalidated a statute which gave the district attorney the
power to veto a decision of the trial judge to order a defendant
charged with a narcotics offense to be diverted into a pretrial
treatment program. In Cascade, the Washington Supreme Court
cited with approval both People v. Superior Court, and
Esteybar v. Municipal Court. 8
In People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins,3 9 the Illinois Supreme
Court considered an identical attack on section 9-1(d) of the
Criminal Code of 1961.40 The defendant claimed that the statute
violated the separation of powers provision of article II, section 1
of the Constitution of Illinois. Section 9-1(d) provides in part:
Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in Subsection (b) and to consider any aggravating
or mitigating factors as indicated in Subsection (c). '"
32. Id. at 94, 473 P.2d at 996, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
33. 5 Cal. 3d 119, 485 P.2d 1140, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1971).
34. "Since a prosecutor may not be vested with authority to foreclose the exercise of
a judicial power, we have concluded that requiring his consent. . . violates the doctrine
of separation of powers." Id. at 122, 485 P.2d at 1141, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 525.
35. Id. at 127, 485 P.2d at 1145, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
36. 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974).
37. Id. at 66, 520 P.2d at 410, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (emphasis omitted).
38. 94 Wash. 2d at 778, 621 P.2d at 119.
39. 77 Ill.
2d 531, 397 N.E.2d 809 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 953 (1980).
40. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(d) (1979).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
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Like RCW 10.95.040, the Illinois statute confers upon the prosecutor the sole power to initiate the death sentence proceedings.
By a margin of four to three, the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the statute violated the separation of
powers doctrine.4 But the majority's rationale was premised
upon the assumption that the statute did not authorize
43
prosecutorial participation in the sentencing process. Both the
Cousins majority and the minority justices agreed that sentencing was a judicial function upon which the prosecution could not
encroach. But they disagreed as to whether the prosecutor's sole
power to initiate consideration of a death sentence constituted
participation in the sentencing process.4 4
The Cousins majority accepted the very same argument
that the Washington Supreme Court unanimously rejected in
Cascade.4 5 The Cousins majority held that simply because a
prosecutorial decision not to request capital punishment effec-

tively precluded imposition of a death sentence, that did not

mean that the prosecution was participating in the sentencing
process."" But the very same theory that "prosecutorial preclusion" of a sentencing alternative as an encroachment on the
47
judicial function of sentencing was accepted in Cascade. Thus,
while the Illinois Supreme Court majority may assert that there
is no support in its prior decisions48 "to support that theory,"
42. Cousins, 77 II. 2d at 535-36, 397 N.E.2d at 812.
43. Id. at 540-43, 397 N.E.2d at 813-14.
44. Id. at 544-45, 397 N.E.2d at 816.
45. See Cascade, 94 Wash. 2d at 781, 621 P.2d at 120.
46. The prosecutor of course does not himself impose the death sentence, nor
can he require that it be imposed, for the judge or sentencing jury may conclude that the statutory conditions specified for the imposition of the death
penalty have not been met. The present argument focuses rather on the fact
that no death sentence may be imposed at all without a sentencing proceeding,
and that such a proceeding cannot take place unless it is requested by the
prosecutor, in which case it becomes mandatory. If the prosecutor falls to
request a sentencing hearing, he thus has precluded the imposition of a death
sentence, and in that sense, it is argued, he has participatedin the sentencing process. We find no authority in the decisions of this court to support that
theory....
Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 535-36, 397 N.E.2d at 812 (emphasis added).
47. 94 Wash. 2d at 780, 621 P.2d at 120.
48. The dissenter in Cousins observed that the majority conveniently ignored cases
where the Illinois Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional the participation of the
executive branch in the sentencing function. 77 IIl. 2d at 547-48, 397 N.E.2d at 817
(Ryan, J., dissenting). See People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, 44 N.E.2d 569 (1942) (grant
of authority to the Division of Correction to change the maximum or minimum sentence
unconstitutionally vested judicial power in an administrative body); People ex rel. Mar-
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the Washington Supreme Court has unanimously accepted the
theory that "prosecutorial preclusion" of a sentencing alternative is unconstitutional.
The Washington Legislature has provided that death is one
form of punishment available for persons convicted of first
degree aggravated murder. Once the legislature has prescribed
the punishment for a particular offense, it cannot condition the
imposition of a particular sentence upon the prior approval of
the prosecutor. 4'9 As noted by the dissenters in Cousins:
[Tihe judicial function of imposing the death sentence cannot
be carried out unless the State's Attorney permits a sentencing
hearing to be conducted. If the legislature can so condition the
performance of this judicial function, it could also provide that,
"where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether or not a defendant may be sentenced
to probation." Such an undesirable restriction could conceivably be imposed by the legislature in response to the indignation expressed by the media at an unpopular decision of a
court in granting probation in a particular case. The possibility
of such curtailment of the court's powers could severely hamper the performance of the judicial function in a manner mandated by article VI, section 1, of our constitution."
tin v. Mallary, 195 Ill. 582, 63 N.E. 508 (1902) (legislature could not confer upon execu-

tive branch the authority to send to penitentiary persons whom courts had committed to

a reformatory). See also Note, The Prosecutor's Discretionary Power to Initiate the
Death Sentencing Hearing, DE PAUL L. REV. 1097, 1102-06 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Death Sentencing]. But see People v. Randolph, 13 Ill. 2d 552, 150 N.E.2d 603, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 852 (1958). The majority relied upon three prior decisions where it had
upheld a statute which granted the prosecutor the authority to decide whether to transfer a juvenile case to adult court. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 536, 397 N.E.2d at 812; see People
v. Sprinkle, 56 Ill.2d 257, 307 N.E.2d 161, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974), overruled,
People v. Rahn, 59 Ill. 2d 302, 319 N.E.2d 787 (1974) (as stated in People v. Pedrosa, 36
Ill. App. 3d 207, 343 N.E.2d 649 (1976)); People v. Bombacino, 52 Ill. 2d 17, 280 N.E.2d
697, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); People v. Handley, 51111. 2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972), overruled, People v. Rahn, 59 II. 2d 302, 319 N.E.2d
787 (1974) (as stated in People v. Pedrosa, 36 Ill. App. 3d 207, 343 N.E.2d 649 (1976)).
The majority reasoned that by giving the prosecutor the power to transfer a juvenile case
to adult court, the legislature had granted him the same power "to increase the severity
of the sanction which might be visited upon the defendant" that § 9-1(d) conferred with
respect to the death penalty. Cousins, 77 III. 2d at 536, 397 N.E.2d at 812. But the juvenile transfer statute, unlike § 9-1(d), did not confer the ultimate authority on the prosecutor, for if the juvenile court judge objected to the prosecutor's decision the issue was
referred to the chief judge of the circuit court for his decision. See People v. Rahn, 59
Ill.2d 302, 304-05, 319 N.E.2d 787, 789 (1974). See also Death Sentencing, supra note 48,
at 1097, 1103, nn. 38-39.
49. See Cascade, 94 Wash. 2d at 778, 621 P.2d at 119.
50. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 549-50, 397 N.E. 2d at 818 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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In a recent decision by Division One of the Washington
Court of Appeals, Judge Ringold complained: "For too long
Washington courts have unquestioningly accepted the power of
the Legislature to eliminate the power of the judiciary in the
area of sentencing. We have yet to measure this assumed legislative right against the unusually broad judicial power granted by
article 4, section 6 of our constitution. . .. .51 A separation of
powers attack upon RCW 10.95 may soon provide an appropriate test case in which to resolve this issue.
RCW 10.95.040 grants Washington prosecutors an absolute
veto power over the imposition of the sentence of death, thus
depriving judges of a sentencing alternative and thereby violating the doctrine of the separation of powers and the rule laid
down by the Cascade court. For these reasons, the special sentencing proceeding required by the present legislative scheme
for the death penalty is unconstitutional.

III.

THE ABSENCE OF A GRAND JURY CHECK AGAINST

OVERZEALOUS PROSECUTORS SEEKING DEATH VIOLATES THE

FIFTH AMENDMENT

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, while in actual service in time of war or public danger."
Notwithstanding the clear language of the fifth amendment,
most states do not employ grand juries, even in capital cases,
except on extremely rare occasions. In Washington State, the
grand jury cannot even be considered an endangered species. It
became extinct many years ago. Capital crimes, like all other
felonies, are prosecuted by information.
The constitutionality of the practice of using informations
in capital criminal trials in state courts was upheld nearly 100
years ago. The United States Supreme Court decided in
51. State v. Hall, 35 Wash. App. 302, 309-10, 666 P.2d 930, 934 (1983) (Ringold, J.,
concurring). Judge Ringold concluded that the probation statutes at issue in Hall
encroached upon the judicial power to determine an appropriate sentence for a defendant in a felony case. Id. (footnote omitted).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Hurtado v. California" that the grand jury indictment clause
was not applicable to the states, and only served to require the
federal government to abide by its terms. The Hurtado Court
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
did not incorporate any of the constitutional provisions contained in the Bill of Rights." The continued vitality of this century old decision is, however, highly questionable.5 5
Twining v. New Jersey" demonstrates that twenty-four
years after Hurtado,the Court still adhered to its nonincorporation theory. The Twining Court held that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was not binding upon states
through the operation of the fourteenth amendment.5 7 The
53. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
54. Id. at 535.
55. The Hurtado view of the due process clause was premised upon the Court's
heavy reliance on the "recognized canon of interpretation" that a court must not assume
that any portion of a law is superfluous. Id. at 534. The Court noted that the fourteenth
amendment due process clause was identical to the fifth amendment due process clause.
The fifth amendment, in turn, contains several specific provisions regarding grand jury
indictments, double jeopardy, and the privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CoNsT.
Amend V. In addition to these specific provisions, the fifth amendment provides that
"[n]o person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law
.... " Id. According to the Hurtado Court, if the phrase "due process of law" were to
include the specific constitutional guarantees which preceded it in the text of the fifth
amendment, then the fifth amendment due process clause would be a useless and redundant appendage to the rest of the amendment. 110 U.S. at 535. Since the framers were
quite capable of writing explicit and specific guarantees for procedures such as grand
jury indictments, the phrase "due process of law" must, according to the HurtadoCourt,
encompass some other type of constitutional protection. Id. at 536.
The natural and obvious inference [arising from application of the canon that
no portion of the fifth amendment is superfluous] is, that in the sense of the
Constitution, "due process of law" was not meant or intended to include, ex vi
termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any case. The conclusion is equally irresistible, that when the same phrase was employed in the
Fourteenth Amendment to restrain the action of the States, it was used in the
same sense and with no greater extent; and that if in the adoption of that
amendment it had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of the
grand jury in all the States, it would have embodied, as did the Fifth Amendment, express declaration to that effect.
Id. at 534-35.
Under the Hurtado theory of due process, as long as a state acted consistently with
respect to all criminal defendants, it would not contravene the requirements of due process. A state could deny jury trials to all defendants, use informations in all cases, routinely permit successive prosecutions for the same offense, and refuse to provide anyone
with a lawyer. But if the state refrained from "partial" treatment, and adhered to "general" practices of criminal procedure applicable to all, no due process violation would
occur.
56. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
57. Id. at 114.
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Court observed that it had already held that neither the jury
trial provision nor the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment was binding upon the states through the fourteenth
amendment.' 8 Although the Twining Court rejected the incorporation argument advanced by the defendants,59 for the first time
the Court conceded, in dicta, that some incorporation of the Bill
of Rights through the due process clause might be warranted.
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by
the first eight Amendments against National action may also
be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them
would be a denial of due process of law. If this is so, it is not
because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendthey are
ments, but because they are of such a nature that
s0
law.
of
process
included in the conception of due
The Twining Court conceded that the concept of due process of law was elusive. The Court said it "preferred that its full
meaning be gradually ascertained.

arise. '""

. .

in the course of the deci-

Returning to the concept of due
sion of cases as they
process as a doctrine "intended to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.

.. , the Court

concluded that the self-incrimination privilege "came into existence not as an essential part of due process, but as a wise and
beneficent rule of evidence developed in the course of judicial
decision.""

The Twining Court did, however, introduce a new historical
element into due process analysis, by focusing on
how the right was rated during the time when the meaning of
due process was in a formative state and before it was incorpo58. Id. at 111; see also Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), overruled, Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904), overruled,
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
59. Twining, 211 U.S. at 98. The Twining defendants argued:
[Tihe safeguards of personal rights which are enumerated in the first eight
articles of Amendment to the Federal Constitution, sometimes called the Federal Bill of Rights, though they were by those Amendments originally secured
only against National action, are among the privilege and immunities of citizens of the United States, which this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects against State action.
Id.
60. Id. at 99 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 100.
62. Id. at 101.
63. Id. at 106.
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rated in American Constitutional law. Did those who then were
formulating and insisting upon the rights of the people entertain the view that the right was so fundamental that there
would be no due process without it?"
This focus on historical analysis marked a significant departure from earlier cases. In Hurtado, the lone dissenter, Justice
Harlan, had relied upon a similar historical analysis in arguing
that the absence of a grand jury indictment in a capital case was
a denial of due process.
[I]t is a fact of momentous interest in this discussion, that,
when the Fourteenth Amendment was submitted and adopted,
the Bill of Rights and the constitutions of twenty-seven states
expressly forbade criminal prosecutions, by information, for
capital cases; while in the remaining ten states, they were
impliedly forbidden by a general clause declaring that no person should be deprived of life otherwise than by "the judgment
of his peers or the law of the land" or "without due process of
law." It may be safely affirmed that, when that Amendment
was adopted, a criminal prosecution by information, for a
crime involving life, was not permitted in any one of the states
composing the union."
Although the majority turned a deaf ear towards Harlan's
historical analysis in Hurtado, the Twining Court employed the
very same type of historical analysis to support the conclusion
that "due process" did not encompass the self-incrimination
privilege." After examining the "popularity" of the self-incrimination privilege among the states, the Twining Court concluded,
64. Id. at 107.
65. 110 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. [Tlhe history of the incorporation of the privilege in an amendment to the
National Constitution is full of significance in this connection. Five states, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia and Connecticut, ratified the Constitution without proposing amendments. Massachusetts then followed with a
ratification, accompanied by a recommendation of nine amendments, none of
which referred to the privilege; Maryland with a ratification without proposing;
South Carolina with a ratification accompanied by a recommendation of four
amendments, none of which referred to the privilege, and New Hampshire with
a ratification accompanied by a recommendation of twelve amendments, none
of which referred to the privilege. The nine States requisite to put the Constitution in operation ratified it without a suggestion of incorporating this
privilege ....

Thus it appears that four only of the thirteen original States insisted upon
incorporating the privilege in the Constitution ....
Twining, 211 U.S. at 108-09.
...
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in accord with Hurtado, that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment "does not control mere forms of procedure in
'
state courts or regulate practice therein." The Twining Court
held that the states were free to ignore the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
s
Nearly thirty years later, in Palko v. Connecticut, the
Court rejected the argument that the due process clause made
the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause binding upon the
states. But the Palko Court was forced to concede that the era
of complete nonincorporation was over. Although the Court had
held that the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments did not apply
to state criminal prosecutions, it was forced to concede that the
due process clause had been held to require the states to abide
by the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free exercise of religion, and the right of peaceable assembly.69 The Palko Court admitted that in the context
of the first amendment and in other situations, "immunities that
are valid against the federal government by force of the specific
pledges of particular amendments have been found to be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the
70
Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states."
To dispel the notion that the Court's prior due process cases
comprised merely "a hasty catalogue" of "cases on the one side
and the other" of a wavering line of division, the Palko Court
asserted the following "rationalizing principle." Using as examples the sixth amendment right to a jury trial and the fifth
amendment right to a grand jury, the Palko Court stated in
dicta:
The right to trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution
except as the result of an indictment may have value and
importance. Even so, they are not of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is not to violate a
"principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Few would be so

narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlight-

67. Id. at 112.
68. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
69. Id. at 324. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1936) (freedom of
assembly); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1935) (freedom of the

press); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (freedom of the press);
Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (freedom of religion);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1924) (freedom of speech).
70. 302 U.S. at 324-25 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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ened system of justice would be impossible without them.
What is true of jury trials and indictments is true also, as the
cases show, of the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination. This too might be lost, and justice still be done.7 1
Using this new test of "selective incorporation" of those portions
of the Bill of Rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, the Palko Court concluded that the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment was not binding upon the State of
2
Connecticut.
Under the Palko test, if a court could imagine a system in
which a defendant's trial was not so unfair as to shock the conscience of the court, then the constitutional right under scrutiny
was not so essential as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." ' Thus, in Adamson v. California," the Court again
rejected the argument that the fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege was binding upon the states, and reaffirmed its
5
earlier holding in Twining.7
Two key developments did occur during the selective incorporation era. First, there was the erosion of the Hurtado theory
that due process did not include any of the specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. In Powell v. Alabama,76 the Court held that
the sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal cases was
binding upon the states by reason of the due process clause, at
least in capital cases where the defendant was on trial for his
life." The Hurtado Court had held that since no portion of the
constitution should be rendered superfluous, the meaning of the
due process clause must necessarily be entirely distinct and
divorced from the specific guarantees contained elsewhere in the
Bill of Rights.78 The Powell Court confronted this argument
head-on and rejected it:
The sixth amendment, in terms, provides that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right "to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense." In the face of the reasoning of the Hurtado case, if it stood alone, it would be difficult
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 325 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 324-25.
332 U.S. 46 (1942).
See supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).

77. Id. at 66.
78. 110 U.S. at 534.
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to justify the conclusion that the right to counsel, being thus
specifically granted by the Sixth Amendment, was also within
the intendment of the due process of law clause. 9
Recognizing that despite Hurtado several cases had held
that the specific guarantees of the first amendment apply to the
states, the Powell Court held:
[N]otwithstanding the sweeping character of the language in
the Hurtado case, the rule laid down is not without exceptions.
The rule is an aid to construction, and in some instances may
be conclusive; but it must yield to more compelling considerations whenever such considerations exist. The fact that the
right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied
without violating those "fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions" is obviously one of those compelling considerations
which must prevail in determining whether it is embraced
within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
although it be specifically dealt with in another part of the federal Constitution.8"
The second development of the Palko era was the focus on
capitalpunishment as a key factor in assessing whether a defendant had received due process of law. In Powell, the defendants
were tried for murder and sentenced to death, following a trial
at which they had not been represented by counsel.8 1 The Court
held that execution of such a death sentence "would be little
short of judicial murder, [and] it cannot be doubted would be a
gross violation of due process of law; and we venture to think
that no appellate court, state or federal, would hesitate so to
decide." 2
In the absence of a death sentence, though, the Court was
unwilling to lay down any per se rule requiring that defendants
be represented by counsel. In Betts v. Brady,8 3 the Court held
that the selective incorporation doctrine required that the sixth
amendment right to counsel bind the states only in some
selected cases. The "selective application" of the sixth amendment was to hinge upon the particular facts of the case before
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

287 U.S. at 66.
Id. at 67 (citations omitted).
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 72.
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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the Court.8 4
The Betts Court held that due process was not violated in a
case where the defendant had been convicted of robbery and
sentenced to eight years in prison. 5 But the Powell Court held
that due process was violated where the convicted defendants
were sentenced to death. 88 Death thus emerged as a critical factor in assessing the bounds of due process.
Beginning in 1961 with Mapp v. Ohio, 87 and ending with
Benton v. Maryland8 the Supreme Court, over the span of
eight years, thoroughly repudiated the Palko doctrine. Every
case decided during those years "incorporated" the Bill of
Rights provision at issue and held it binding upon the states.as
84. Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial
of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in
other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such
denial.
Id. at 462.
85. Id. at 472-73.
86. 287 U.S. at 71.
87. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
88. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
89. The Court's record of overruling prior decisions during this era is truly astonishing. In rapid succession, the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment due
process clause obligated the states to abide by the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962); the sixth amendment's right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)); the fifth amendment's
guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908)); the sixth amendment's right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967); the sixth amendment's right to confrontation, Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965) (overruling West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1903)); the sixth amendment's right to compulsory process, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)); the sixth
amendment's right to a jury trial, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (overruling
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900)); and the fifth amendment's prohibition against
double jeopardy, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
These decisions specifically abandoned the Palko doctrine of "selective incorporation." In Benton, the Court specifically overruled Palko and announced a new principle
of due process analysis:
Palko represented an approach to basic constitutional rights which this court's
recent decisions have rejected. It was cut of the same cloth as Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), the case which held that a criminal defendant's right to
counsel was to be determined by deciding in each case whether the denial of
that right was "shocking to the universal sense of justice." Id. at 462. It relied
upon Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), which held that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was not an element of Fourteenth
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In abandoning Palko, the Supreme Court implicitly adopted the
theory of total incorporation of the Bill of Rights by the fourteenth amendment due process clause. In Gideon v. Wainwright,90 Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, criticized
the Betts decision for refusing to acknowledge "that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamentally safeguards
of liberty immune from federal abridgement are equally protected against State invasion by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." '
Reiterating the principle explained and applied in Powell v.
Alabama, the Gideon Court explicitly stated that "despite
sweeping language to the contrary in Hurtado v. California, the
Fourteenth Amendment 'embraced' those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions,' even though they had been 'specifically dealt with in another part of the federal Constitution.' "'I
The concept that the guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights protect the individual only against the federal government has been abandoned. There is only one set of constitutional rules to play by. As the Benton Court observed, "[i]n an
increasing number of cases, the Court 'has rejected the notion
that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a
watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of
the Bill of Rights . . "98
The Supreme Court has recognized its own willingness to
overrule past precedent in this area. In Malloy v. Hogan,9 the
Court commented that it had "not hesitated to re-examine past
decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central
role in the preservation of basic liberties than that which was
Amendment due process. Betts was overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Twining, by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Our recent
cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic constitutional rights
can be denied by the States as long as the totality of the circumstances does
not disclose a denial of "fundamental fairness." Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is "fundamental to the American scheme of
justice," Duncan v. Louisiana, supra at 149, the same constitutional standards
apply against both the State and Federal Governments. Palko's roots had thus
been cut away years ago.
Benton, 395 U.S. at 794-95.
90. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
91. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 341 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (citation omitted)).
93. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794 (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11).
94. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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contemplated by its framers when they added the Amendment
to our constitutional scheme." 95
It has now been nearly one hundred years since Hurtado v.
California was decided. Both the Hurtado nonincorporation and
the Palko selective incorporation doctrines were repudiated long
ago. The United States Supreme Court has not had occasion to
reexamine the holding of Hurtado since deciding Gaines v.
Washington," forty-five years ago. More recently, however, the
Supreme Court has hinted strongly that the change in due process analysis will necessitate overruling Hurtado when the issue
is next presented to the Court. In Gosa v. Mayden,7 the Court
put the handwriting on the wall with the following pointed
observation: "The Court, of course, has not yet held the indictment requirement of the Fifth Amendment to be binding upon
the states.""
The current test of due process incorporation stresses the
significance of specific inclusion of the right in the Bill of Rights
and the historical roots of the right. In Duncan v. Louisiana,"
the Court neatly summed up the difference between the abandoned Palko doctrine and the current focus on whether the right
at issue is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." In
Palko, the Court opined that since it was possible to imagine a
"fair and enlightened" judicial system which did not honor the
right to trial by jury, it was clear that a jury trial was not central
to "the essence of a scheme if ordered liberty." 100 The Duncan
Court replaced such imagination exercises with a framework of
historical analysis:
[Riecent cases, on the other hand, have proceeded upon the
valid assumption that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has
been developing contemporaneously in England and in this
country. The question thus is whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental-whether, that is, a
procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered
95. Id. at 5. See also Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406.
96. 277 U.S. 81, 86 (1928).
97. 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
98. Id. at 668 n.1 (emphasis added).
99. 391 U.S. at 149.
100. 302 U.S. at 325.
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liberty."'

The issue is no longer whether a constitutional provision is "necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that
might be imagined but [whether it] is fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the American
states." 102
- To answer this question, the more recent cases focus on two
things. First, is the right specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights? If the answer is yes, that in itself gives rise to a presumption that the right is "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice." In Gideon, the Court stated: "[Tihis court
has looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights
guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment makes
them obligatory on the States."'10 3 And in Washington v.
Texas, 04 the Court said: "[Wie have increasingly looked to the
specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to determine
whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of
law." 10 5 In Klopfer v. North Carolina,10 6 the Court held that the
speedy trial guarantee of the sixth amendment applied to the
states: "That this right was considered fundamental at this early
period in our history is evidenced by its guarantee in the constitutions of several of the states, as well as by its prominent posi107
tion in the Sixth Amendment.'
The other clear focus of recent due process decisions has
been upon the historical lineage of the right at issue. In Benton,
the Court observed that the prohibition against double jeopardy
"became established in the common law of England long before
this nation's independence" and "was carved into the jurisprudence of this country through the medium of BlackThe double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendstone. .. "1os8
ment was a fundamental right because it was "deeply ingrained
in at the least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence" and
it traced its origins "from the very beginning" of our Anglo101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

391 U.S. at 149 n.14.
Id.
372 U.S. at 341.
388 U.S. 14 (1966).
Id. at 18; accord, Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
386 U.S. 213 (1966).
Id. at 225-26 (emphasis added).
395 U.S. at 795.
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American constitutional tradition. 0 9 The guarantee of a speedy
trial was held binding upon the state since that right "has its
roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage" since it
first appeared in the Magna Carta in 1215.110 The rights of confrontation and cross-examination "have ancient roots." ' The
long pedigree of the right to trial by jury was traced in Duncan
v. Louisiana from the Magna Carta through the British Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689, the Continental Congress of
1774, and the Declaration of Independence.""
Employing the due process doctrine of Benton, Duncan,
and Malloy, the central issue with respect to the Washington
death penalty is whether the fifth amendment indictment guarantee in capital and infamous cases is fundamental to the American political system. Answering this question requires an examination of the history of the grand jury, culminating in the
inclusion of the grand jury indictment clause in the text of the
fifth amendment.
The English institution of the grand jury is more than eight
centuries old. While the English use of the grand jury can easily
be traced to the Assize of Clarendon of 1166, scholars have
traced the development of the grand jury even further. It is generally accepted that the grand jury developed from the use of
the "inquisitio" procedure used by the continental Carlovingian
kings." '
109. Id. at 796 (emphasis added).
110. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223.
111. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404.
112. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
113. The Frankish kings used the inquisition to summon subjects before the king to
supply him with information on various subjects touching the administration of government, including the detection of crime. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
312 (7th ed. 1956). The Normans, who conquered the Franks, adopted the procedure and
brought it with them to England following the victory of William the Conqueror in 1066.
Id.; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 141 (2d ed. 1959).
In the Assize of 1166, King Henry II set down the first law governing the investigation of criminal matters by juries. The law required that twelve men from the local village "hundred" where the crime allegedly occurred, and four men from each township in
the county, should be assembled and placed under oath, "to tell the truth; if in their
hundred or their township there be any man who is accused or generally suspected of
being a robber or murderer or thief, or any man who is a receiver of robbers, murderers
or thieves, since our lord the king was king." 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 77; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra, at 152. Ten years later the king added the crimes of forgery
and arson to the list of crimes which could be investigated by the grand jury. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra, at 152; Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR.
L. REv. 101, 111 (1931). See also Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or
Fair Play?, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1106 (1955).
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The precursor of the modern criminal grand jury was not
exclusively reserved for criminal proceedings. It was a mechanism for ensuring local community participation in the operation of government.
[Tihe grand jury concept. . . was an outgrowth, as were the
civil jury and the criminal petty [sic] jury concepts, of the early
Frankish legal custom of calling together a body of neighbors
to give upon oath a true answer to some question. These bodies
of neighbors came to be entrusted with more and more power.
It is difficult to classify these early juries because they often
performed all of the functions which at a later date became the
separate functions of civil juries, grand juries and criminal
petit juries." '
At first the grand jury performed both the tasks of accusation and determining guilt. In 1351-52, Parliament enacted a
statute which provided that one who sat on the accusing jury (an
"indictor") could not sit on the jury which determined the truth
of the charge, if the accused raised an objection.' 5
[Tihe accusing jury came both to accuse those suspected of
crime and to determine the guilt or innocence of those it
accused. Acting in the latter capacity, it performed the functions of the modern criminal petit jury. . . . [Tihe criminal
petit jury was preceded in historical development by the accusing or grand jury, and evolved from it. . . . Gradually. . . the
grand jury and the petty [sic] jury became separated .... lie
The alternative method of initiating a prosecution by information developed later, as an invention of English kings who
wished to circumvent the grand jury. The information seems to
have made its first appearance in the reign of Edward I (12721307) as a means of putting a man on trial even though no
indictment had been obtained. Public hostility towards this
practice soon brought about a restriction of the use of informations to misdemeanor cases only. The Act of 11 Henry VII, c. 3
murder and felony" from
passed in 1494 excluded "treason,
117
being prosecuted by information.
The English prohibition against the use of informations in
felony cases became an established part of the constitutional law
114.
115.
116.
117.

Morse, supra note 113, at 107.
Morse, supra note 113, at 114.
Id.
Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
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of England. As stated by Blackstone: "[T]hese informations (of
every kind) are confined by the constitutional law to mere misdemeanors only. ....

I's

The framers of the federal Constitution followed the
English constitutional practice by providing that the fifth
amendment requirement of a grand jury indictment applied to
any "capital or otherwise infamous crime."'119 Infamous crimes
were subsequently equated with felonies, and referred to all
crimes punishable by imprisonment at hard labor in a prison or
penitentiary. 20
The limitation on the use of informations to misdemeanors
was historically linked to the fact that all felonies were punishable by death at common law. Under English common law, a
felony conviction of any kind meant the imposition of a sentence
of death. 2 ' Thus, the practical effect of restricting information
prosecutions to misdemeanor cases was to prevent putting a
man's life in jeopardy solely on the basis of an information
signed by an officer of the King. Blackstone explicitly recognized
the connection between the death sentence and the requirement
of a grand jury indictment.
[I]nformations . . . are confined by the constitutional law to
mere misdemeanors only; for, whenever any capital offense is
charged, the same law requires that the accusation be warranted by the oath of twelve men before the party shall be put
to answer it. 2 '

The majority justices in Hurtado seem to have simply misunderstood this critical point, arguing that:
if an indictment or presentment by a grand jury is essential to
due process of law in all cases of imprisonment for crime, it
applies not only to felonies but to misdemeanors and petty
offences, and the conclusion would be inevitable that informations as a substitute for indictments would be illegal in all
128
cases.

However, in his dissent, Justice Harlan accurately observed
118. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
119. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

§ 310 (Lewis ed. 1898).

120. See United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922) (misdemeanor); Ex parte
Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885) (felony).
121. See W. LAFAvE, HANDBOOK ON CRmNAL LAw 546 n.4 (1972).
122. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, § 310 (emphasis added).
123. 110 U.S. at 524.
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that neither English constitutional law nor the text of the fifth
124 The fifth amendment
amendment required any such result.

indictment requirement to
expressly limited the grand jury
' 128
"capital and infamous crimes.

Harlan quoted Blackstone at

length to drive home his point that a death sentence could only
result following both an indictment of a grand jury and a finding
of guilt by a petit jury:
Blackstone, after observing that the English law has "wisely
placed this strong and two-fold barrier,of a presentment and a
trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of the crown," says: "The founders of the English law
have, with excellent forecast, contrived that no man shall be
called to answer the King for any capital crime, unless upon
the peremptory accusation of twelve or more of his fellow-subjects, the grand jury. .. ."136

The Hurtado majority did not quarrel with Justice Harlan's
assessment that the grand jury was historically associated with
capital crimes. The majority simply rejected the premise that
English constitutional history was relevant to the constitutional
due process question before it. The majority rejected the argument because acceptance of the relevance of history would have
tied the concept of due process down to one model and prevented the states from experimenting with their own forms of
124. Id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting)(emphasis added).

125. Id. (quoting U.S. CoNsT. amend. V).
126. Id. at 544. Justice Harlan protested that since "human life is involved" he was
compelled to dissent:
Erskine, in his speech delivered in 1784, in defence of the Dean of St. Asaph,
said, in the presence of the judges of the Kings Bench: "If a man were to commit a capital offence in the face of all the judges of England, their united
authority could not put him upon his trial; they could file no complaint against
him .

. .

. The grand jury alone could arraign him, and in their discretion

might likewise finally discharge him, by throwing out the bill, with the names
of all your lordships as witnesses on the back of it. If it be said that this exclusive power of the grand jury does not extend to lesser misdemeanors, which
may be prosecuted by information, I answer, that for that reason it becomes
doubly necessary to preserve the power of the other jury which is left."
Id. at 539, 543-44 (emphasis added).
In Wooddeson's lectures on the Laws of England (Lect. 38), it is said that
"informations cannot be brought in capital cases, nor for misprison of treason." Bacon, in his Abridgment, lays it down:
But though, as my Lord Hale observes, in all criminal causes the most
regular and safe way, and most consonant to the statute of Magna Charta, &c.,
is by presentment or indictment of twelve sworn men, yet he admits that, for
crimes inferior to capital ones, the proceedings may be by information.
Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
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criminal procedure. But the Hurtado majority's view of the relevance of history has not prevailed. History is now the central
focus of the modern due process incorporation doctrine. The
proof of the fundamental nature of a Bill of Rights guarantee
now lies in the assessment of its historical importance in the
Anglo-American system of justice.12 7

Ironically enough, the Supreme Court has already recognized that the historical argument in favor of incorporating the
indictment clause was far stronger than the argument in favor of
incorporating the self-incrimination privilege. In the earlier era
of nonincorporation the Twining Court stated:
Due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not require the state to adopt a particular form of procedure ....

Indeed, the reasoning for including indictment by

grand jury and trial by petit jury in that conception ... was
historically and in principle much stronger [than the argument
in favor of including the privilege against self-incrimination].'"

Yet Twining was subsequently overruled in Malloy v. Hogan.1 2 9
If the historical argument in favor of incorporating the grand
jury indictment clause is "much stronger" than the argument for
incorporating the privilege against self-incrimination, then a fortiori the argument in favor of overruling Hurtado is "much
stronger" than the arguments which prompted the Malloy Court
to overrule Twining.
It need not be decided whether the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires grand jury indictments in all
felony cases. When the case is a capital case, it need only be
decided whether due process is violated where a man is put on
trial for his life without first obtaining the community judgment
of an indicting grand jury. As stated by the elder Justice Harlan:
It is difficult ... to perceive anything in the system of prose-

cuting human beings for their lives, by information, which suggests that the State which adopts it has entered upon an era of
progress and improvement in the law of criminal procedure.
Even the statute of H.7, c. 3, allowing informations, and
"under which Empson and Dudley, and an arbitrary star
chamber, fashioned the proceedings of the law into a thousand
tyrannical forms," expressly declared that it should not extend
127. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
128. 211 U.S. at 112.
129. 378 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1964).
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"to treason, murder or felony, or to any other offence wherefor
any person should lose life or member." '
Putting aside the historical arguments, one might well ask
what purpose is to be served by resurrecting the corpse of the
grand jury from the legal graveyard and requiring its use in all
capital criminal trials. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized the "high place" accorded the grand jury in our system of criminal justice, as the body of citizens which stands
1
between the prosecutor and the accused."" It is precisely
because no one stands between Washington prosecutors and
defendants in capital cases that use of a grand jury should be
constitutionally required in these circumstances.
In Costello v. United States,13 2 the Court opined that the
English institution of the grand jury was brought to America by
the colonists, included in the Constitution by the framers, and
that there was "every reason to believe" it was "intended to
operate like its English progenitor" by permitting a body of citizens to prevent a prosecutor from bringing unfounded, excessive
or unjust accusations against their fellow citizen.
Grand jurors were selected from the body of the people and
their work was not hampered by rigid procedures or evidentiary rules .... Despite its broad power to institute criminal
proceedings the grand jury grew in popular favor with the
years. It acquired an independence in England from control
by the Crown of judges. Its adoption in our Constitution as the
sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases
shows the high place it held as an instrument of justice.""
Similarly, in Wood v. Georgia,181 the Court declared:
Historically this body has been regarded as the primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of
standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group or other, to determine
whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an
15
intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will. 3
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 553-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
350 U.S. 359 (1956).
Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
370 U.S. 375 (1962).
Id. at 390; accord, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1905).
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By charging defendants by information in capital cases,
Washington prosecutors prevent any community input into the
decision to place a defendant on trial for his life. The use of an
information in a capital case completely removes lay citizens
from the decision to seek the ultimate criminal sanction of capital punishment. It is precisely this kind of decision to which the
fifth amendment grand jury indictment clause most clearly
applies. As reflected in Blackstone's Commentaries, the AngloAmerican system of criminal justice has historically adhered to
the proposition that community participation is necessary at two
independent stages of the proceeding. 3 6 The trial jury serves
this "critical function" at the guilt determination stage by
"introducing into the process a lay judgment, reflecting values
generally held in the community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify the state" in imposing a particular punishment. " ' The trial jury in a capital case "can do little more-and
must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death."""
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
Jury sentencing has been considered desirable in capital cases
in order "to maintain a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.' "189
The grand jury serves the same purpose of injecting community values and judgment into the criminal proceeding at the
earlier accusatorial stage. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court
quoted Blackstone's Commentaries with approval, stating: "Our
law has therefore wisely placed this strong and twofold barrier,
of a presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the
people and the prerogative of the crown."14 0 "The institution of
the grand jury is deeply rooted in American history. In England,
the grand jury served for centuries. . . as a protector of citizens
against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action."'
136.
137.
138.
139.
519 n.15
140.
141.

4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at § 349.
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
391 U.S. at 151 (emphasis added).
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1974).
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The elimination of any role for "grand jurors . . . selected
from the body of the people"" 2 by the prosecution in a capital
case is in violation of the grand jury indictment clause of the
fifth amendment. The principle that no man can be forced to
stand trial in a capital case unless there has first been a determination, by lay citizens, that the accusation is true and reasonable, is "fundamental to the American scheme of criminal justice.' 4 For these reasons, Washington State is bound by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to abide by the
requirement of the fifth amendment that, "[n]o person shall be
held to answer for a capital . . crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a grand jury. .. ." The systematic failure of
Washington prosecutors to obtain indictments in capital cases,
and their reliance upon the statutory procedure of filing a notice
of intent to seek the death penalty, violates the plain terms of
the indictment clause of the fifth amendment. A procedure
which permits death penalty trials to be triggered by a
prosecutorial decision to file a piece of paper cannot pass constitutional muster.
IV.

THE

Two SIDES OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS COIN

As noted by Blackstone, the institutions of both the jury
and the grand jury were part of the English system of a "twofold
barrier" placed between the people and the crown, as a means
"4 4
"for preserving the admirable balance of our constitution.
For fear that the executive power "might be dangerous and
destructive to that very constitution, if exerted without check or
control, ' " 5 English constitutional law wisely required "that no
man be called to answer to the King for any capital crime unless
upon the preparatory accusation of twelve or more of his fellowsubjects, the grand jury. .. "6 Indeed, Blackstone cautioned
that any attempt to avoid the use of grand juries, through the
use of informations, must be consistently opposed as "inroads
upon this sacred bulwark of the nation. . . fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our constitution," and, if permitted, "the
precedent may gradually increase and spread to the utter disuse
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
Id. at 151.
Id.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, § 349-350.
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of juries in questions of the most momentous concern." 4 "
As previously discussed in section I, RCW 10.95.040 violates
the separation of powers doctrine by granting the prosecutor an
absolute veto over the availability of capital punishment as a
sentencing alternative. His power to prevent the imposition of
capital punishment is unchecked in this regard. The opposite
side of the coin is that the prosecutor's power to put the defendant on trial for his life is also unchecked where the state initiates the prosecution by information.
The use of the information avoids the necessity of confronting the grand jury. Instead, the court certifies the existence
of probable cause to believe the crime of aggravated first degree
murder has been committed. Although the state must obtain a
magistrate's concurrence as to probable cause for aggravated
first degree murder, there is no requirement that the court must
review the prosecutor's notice of intent to seek the death
penalty.
The filing of a death penalty notice, under RCW 10.95.040,
is effected when the prosecuting attorney has "reason to believe
that there are no sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit
leniency."' 48 There is no mechanism whereby the court reviews
this prosecutorial determination. The prosecutor does not file,
along with the notice of a special sentencing proceeding, any
supporting affidavit setting forth the facts to justify his determination that there is an absence of mitigating circumstances and
that leniency is therefore not merited.
Thus, there is no authority and no mechanism for disputing
the conclusion of the prosecutor that the jury should consider
the imposition of capital punishment. If the notice of special
sentencing proceeding is filed, then the court must put the issue
to the jury for its consideration.
Assuming, arguendo, that the death penalty is not per se
unconstitutional in all cases, then the statutory framework of
RCW 10.95 operates on the assumption that some cases of first
degree aggravated murder warrant capital punishment and other
cases do not. All power to remove death penalty consideration in
a given case is given to the prosecuting attorney. On the other
hand, all power to compel judicial consideration of capital punishment is given to the prosecuting attorney. The simple act of
147. Id.
148. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.040(1) (1981).
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filing a piece of paper, which need not contain any statement of
the facts in support of the prosecutor's conclusion, is sufficient
to force the court to put this issue to the jury. No matter how
mentally ill the defendant, no matter how young, no matter how
much he operated under duress or coercion, and no matter how
strong other mitigating circumstances may be, once the prosecution triggers death penalty deliberations, neither judge nor
grand jury may voice an objection to the procedure.
A statutory scheme such as this one, which vests such complete power in the prosecuting attorney, when coupled with the
failure to seek the judgment of lay grand jurors who might pass
upon the state's conclusion that capital punishment is warranted, constitutes an egregious violation of the principle of separation of powers, and must therefore be held unconstitutional
on its face.
V.

UNFETTERED PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

It is inconsistent with the requirements of fundamental fairness for the legislature to authorize prosecutors to choose
between different levels of potential punishment for defendants
who have all committed the same criminal act. While judges
may tailor sentences to individual defendants, prosecutors may
not. The Washington Supreme Court has observed that the
principles of equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment to the federal Constitution, and by article I, section
12 of the Washington State Constitution, require that
prosecutorial discretion in bringing criminal charges against
defendants must be exercised in accordance with certain minimal standards of fair play. The equal protection principle at
issue here is most frequently referred to as the Zornes doctrine.
But prior to the decision in State v. Zornes,4 9 the Washington
Supreme Court had approved of this constitutional doctrine in
two earlier cases.
First, in Walder v. Belnap,1 50 the court, in dicta, recognized
the principle that if two fully operational statutes are in existence contemporaneously, and if they offer the prosecuting
authorities the option to prosecute for (1) a misdemeanor or (2)
a felony, despite the identity of the criminal act covered by both
statutes, then there is a violation of the defendant's constitu149. 78 Wash. 2d 9, 475 P.2d 109 (1970).
150. 51 Wash. 2d 99, 316 P.2d 119 (1957).
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tional right to equal protection.1 51
In Olsen v. Delmore,""' the court held that where one statute purports to grant a prosecutor the option of charging either
a misdemeanor or a felony for commission of the same crime, a
constitutional violation has occurred.
A statute which prescribes different punishments or different
degrees of punishment for the same act committed under the
same circumstances by persons in like situations is violative of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Such a statute must therefore
be violative of Art. I, Section 12, of the constitution of this
state, relating to privileges and immunities, since this provision
of the State Constitution is substantially identical with the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 3
In Olsen, the court invalidated RCW 9.41.160 (prohibiting
carrying a concealed weapon without a license) as unconstitutionally abridging the equal protection clause and article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution.'" The court
found that the legislature had attempted to "authorize prosecuting officials to charge violations of the Uniform Firearms Act as
a gross misdemeanor or a felony." 151 In Walder, the court found
there was no constitutional defect because it concluded that the
later of the two statutes had impliedly repealed the inconsistent
provisions of the earlier statute.1 " Thus, Walder and Olsen indicate that equal protection violations can be effected either when
one statute alone, or two statutes together, purportedly authorize the prosecutor to seek different punishments for the same
offense.
The magnitude of disparity between the differential punishments has no bearing upon the application of the equal protection principle. The Zornes doctrine was first articulated in cases
where the legislature had authorized differential punishment as
either a felony or a misdemeanor. In Walder, the court considered the felony statute prohibiting taking a motor vehicle without permission, together with the misdemeanor statute making
it unlawful to cause injury to property by riding or driving away
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 101, 316 P.2d at 120.
48 Wash. 2d 545, 295 P.2d 324 (1956).
Id. at 550, 295 P.2d at 327 (citations omitted).
Id. at 551, 295 P.2d at 327.
Id. at 550, 295 P.2d at 327.
Walder, 51 Wash. 2d at 101, 316 P.2d at 120.
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in a vehicle without the authority of the owner. In Zornes, the
issue was framed in terms of the potential joint operation of the
misdemeanor statute outlawing the possession of dangerous
drugs and a felony statute prohibiting the possession of narcotic
drugs. The Zornes court restated the holding of Olsen v.
Delmore:
[T]hat an act which prescribes different punishments for the
same act and thereby purports to authorize the prosecutor to
charge one person with a felony and another with a misdemeanor for the same act committed under the same circumstances, denies the equal protection of the law guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
17
and Article I, Section 12 of the constitution of this state. 5
But the Zornes principle applies whenever the legislature
purports to authorize the prosecution to seek different degrees
of punishment for the same criminal act, even when both punishments are classified as misdemeanors or when both are classified as felonies. 1 5
In a case decided in the same term as Zornes, the supreme
court clarified Olsen by recognizing that the prohibition against
permitting prosecutors to choose between different maximum
levels of potential punishment for the same act applied equally
to cases where the differential punishments both fell within the
same legislative classification as felonies. 5 9 In State v. Ensminger,160 the court noted that if charged under RCW 9.47.060
for receiving "a bet or wager upon the result of a contest or trial
of speed or endurance between horses," the defendants were
potentially subject to felony punishment by confinement in a
penitentiary for one to five years, but if charged under RCW
9.47.140 for "race track gambling," the defendants would only be
subject to potential felony punishment by incarceration for one
157. 78 Wash. 2d at 21, 475 P.2d at 117.
158. Generally speaking, the law with respect to the punishment to be inflicted
for a crime must operate equally on every citizen or inhabitant of the state,
and a statute is void as a denial of the equal protection of the laws which
prescribes different punishments or different degrees of punishment for the
same acts committed under the same circumstances by persons in like
situations.
Id. at 24, 475 P.2d at 119 (quoting 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 564 (1956)) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
159. State v. Enaminger, 77 Wash. 2d 535, 463 P.2d 612 (1970).
160. 77 Wash. 2d 535, 463 P.2d 612 (1970).
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to three years. 161 Despite the fact that both crimes were felonies,
the Olsen rule still prohibited differential degrees of punishment
for the same offense if the choice between the two were left to
the prosecution. The Ensminger court explained that "no person
shall be subjected, for the same offense, to any greater or different punishment from that to which others may be subjected;
hence, statutes that provide different degrees of punishment for
different persons for the same act are unconstitutional." 2
Similarly, in State v.Martell,' the court of appeals agreed
with the defendant that the statutory definitions of criminal
trespass in the first degree and criminal trespass in the second
degree offered the prosecutor an unconstitutional option to
charge the defendant for either a gross misdemeanor or a simple
misdemeanor for commission of the same criminal act. The Martell court applied the Zornes doctrine.16 4
On one occasion, a defendant raised an equal protection
Zornes attack against the (subsequently invalidated) death penalty provisions of former RCW 9A.32.045(7)." 65 In State v.
Green,' 6 the defendant noted that under RCW 9A.32.045(7) the
crime of aggravated murder in the first degree was defined as
murder in the first degree committed in the course of the crime
of rape or kidnapping.16 7 But first degree felony murder, defined
in RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c)(2) and (5)168 encompassed the same act.
First degree felony murder carried a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment, whereas first degree aggravated murder carried a
mandatory sentence of death. The defendant alleged this differential punishment scheme violated Zornes by granting the prosecutor a charging option which allowed the prosecutor to deter161. Id. at 536, 463 P.2d at 614.
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. 22 Wash. App. 415, 591 P.2d 789 (1979).
164. Equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article 1, section 12 of the Washington State
Constitution is denied by the existence of two separate criminal statutes which
declare identical acts to be criminal, but penalize more severely under one than
under the other.
In viewing the two statutes pertaining to criminal trespass, it is evident
that each prescribes different punishment for the same act, namely entering or
remaining unlawfully in a building.
22 Wash. App. at 417-18, 591 P.2d at 790.
165. State v. Green, 91 Wash. 2d 431, 438, 588 P.2d 1370, 1374 (1979). See WASH.
RIv. CODE § 9A.32.045(7), repealed by 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 138, § 24.
166. 91 Wash. 2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979).
167. Id. at 438, 588 P.2d at 1374.
168. Id. at 439, 588 P.2d at 1374.
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mine the maximum possible sentence. The supreme court
169 yet found
recognized the applicability of the Zornes principle,
the Zornes problem was not presented, because the enactment
of the aggravated murder statute, by voter initiative, constituted
170 The
a modification of the preexisting felony murder statute.
Green court concluded that the aggravated murder statute
removed from the prosecutor the option of charging first degree
felony-murder in cases where the aggravated murder statute fit
the facts and circumstances of the crime; thus the prosecutor
statutes.1 7 1
had no discretion to choose between the two
The Zornes doctrine applies where different punishments
are authorized for the same criminal offense. In deciding
whether an equal protection violation exists, the reviewing court
must decide if the two maximum punishments authorized apply
to the same criminal act. The test of whether the same act is
being punished differently is whether the elements of the
offenses prohibited are identical. "It is a denial of equal protection of law if the prosecutor has discretion to seek varying
punishment by proof of identical criminal
degrees of
' '172
elements.
In a number of cases the courts have held that although two
statutes punish identical offenses, there is no equal protection
violation because: (1) the more recently enacted statute effected
73
a repeal of the earlier statute;1 or, (2) because one statute is
more specific than the other statute, and therefore the general
rule dictating that specific statutes govern over general statutes
prosecutor of any option to choose between the two
deprives the
17 4
statutes.
169. "It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that no person shall be
subjected for the same offense to any greater or differing punishment from that to which
others may be subjected." Id. at 438, 588 P.2d at 1374.
170. Id. at 439-40, 588 P.2d at 1375.
171. Id.
172. Ensminger, 77 Wash. 2d at 536, 463 P.2d at 614 (emphasis added). Accord,
State v. Cann, 92 Wash. 2d 193, 196, 595 P.2d 912, 915 (1979).
173. See, e.g., State v. Zornes, 78 Wash. 2d 9, 475 P.2d 109 (1970); State v. Ensminger, 77 Wash. 2d 535, 463 P.2d 612 (1970); Walder v. Belnap, 51 Wash. 2d 99, 316
P.2d 119 (1957).
174. See State v. Cann, 92 Wash. 2d 193, 595 P.2d 912 (1970) ("special law [WASH.
REv. CODE § 9A.88.080, prohibiting the knowing advancement of prostitution] applies to
the subject matter contemplated by it to the exclusion of the general [law, WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.28.030, prohibiting criminal solicitation]"); see also State v. Green, 91 Wash.
2d 431, 588 P.2d 370 (1979) ("overlay" death penalty statute removes prosecutor's option
to charge first degree felony murder where circumstances show first degree aggravated
murder was committed).
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In a number of Washington cases courts have not applied
the Zornes doctrine where the two crimes involved have different criminal elements."" But it is clear that RCW 10.95.030
authorizes two levels of punishment for the same crime of aggravated murder in the first degree. That statute lists the alternative sentences available for commission of the crime:
RCW 10.95.030 Sentences for Aggravated First Degree Murder. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section,
any person convicted of the crime of aggravated first degree
murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole . . . . (2) If, pursuant to a special
sentencing proceeding held under RCW 10.95.050 the trier of
fact finds that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances
to merit leniency, the sentence shall be death.1 76
There can be no contention, in an aggravated first degree
murder case, that there are two different crimes with different
elements. There is only one criminal statute to examine. That
statute, RCW 10.95.020,177 is entitled "Aggravated First Degree
Murder Defined." The decision whether to kill a defendant convicted of aggravated first degree murder depends upon the outcome of a special sentencing proceeding governed by RCW
10.95.040-.060.' 7 If the prosecutor determines that he wishes
to seek the death penalty, and if he files the notice of the special
sentencing proceeding as specified in RCW 10.95.040, then all
persons convicted of aggravated first degree murder will be sentenced by the jury. At a special sentencing proceeding, the jury
is to be asked, "Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances
175. "[The Zornes rule] applies only when the statutes described identical
crimes:
the equal protection guarantees are not contravened if the statutes require proof
of different elements in order to convict for each offense." State v. Burley, 23 Wash.
App. 881,
883, 598 P.2d 428, 430 (1979) (first and second degree manslaughter are different
crimes;
the former requires proof of reckless conduct and the latter crime does not).
See also
State v. Reid, 66 Wash. 2d 243, 401 P.2d 988 (1965) (different elements
for unlawful
possession of narcotic drugs and unlawful use of narcotic drugs); State v. Richard,
27
Wash. App. 703, 621 P.2d 165 (1980) (different elements for possession of
a stolen

firearm under WASH. Riv. CODE § 9A.56.160(1)(e) and third degree theft of firearms
under WASH. Rzv. CODE §§ 9A.56.020, .050); State v. Eckman, 9 Wash. App.
905, 515

P.2d 837 (1973) (second degree assault and resisting arrest have different elements).
176. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.030 (1981).
177. Id. § 10.95.020.
178. Id. §§ 10.95.040-.060.
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to merit leniency?"' '
The absence of mitigating factors is not an element of
aggravated first degree murder. Nowhere in RCW 10.95.020 does
it list the absence of mitigating circumstances as an element of
the offense.
RCW 10.95.040 purports to give the prosecutor guidance in
determining whether to seek the death penalty. It instructs the
prosecutor to seek capital punishment when he has "reason to
believe that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to
merit leniency."18 0 But unlike the predecessor death penalty
statute,1 8 1 the prosecutor's notice of intent to seek the death
penalty no longer requires that the prosecutor notify the defendant that he "intends to prove" the appropriateness of the death
sentence in the special sentencing proceeding.
The jury is similarly told to consider whether it is convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there are no mitigating
182
But the jury is not
circumstances meriting leniency.
instructed that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the
absence of mitigating circumstances. And under the state
8
supreme court's recent decision in State v. Bartholomew, s it is
clear that the prosecution does not bear the burden of proving
the absence of mitigating factors.
Under Bartholomew, the prosecution is forbidden, except in
rebuttal, to present any evidence at the special sentencing proceeding "other than the defendant's criminal record."'" The
Bartholomew court held:
The constitutional requirement of a channeled jury discretion
demands that, if the defendant produces no mitigating evidence, the prosecution should be limited to the factors proved
at the guilt phase together with the defendant's criminal
record.'"
179. Id. § 10.95.060(4).
180. Id. § 10.95.040(1).
181. Id. § 10.94.010 (1979), repealed by Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138, § 24, 1981
Wash. Laws.
182. Id. § 10.95.060(4) (1981).
183. 98 Wash. 2d 173, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982), vacated, Washington v. Bartholomew,
103 S. Ct. 3530 (1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3548 (1983).
184. 98 Wash. 2d at 197, 654 P.2d at 1184.
185. Id. (emphasis added). Bartholomew was decided on federal constitutional
grounds. Following the Bartholomew decision the United States Supreme Court held, in
Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), that federal constitutional law did not prohibit
the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. Bartholomew was
remanded to the Washington Supreme Court for reconsideration pursuant to Zant. It
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It is clear under Bartholomew that the state need not prove
that the defendant does not deserve to live. The state need not
present, and indeed is forbidden from presenting, any evidence
that would prove that the defendant did not act under the influence of extreme mental disturbance;186 did not kill with the consent of the victim; " 7 did not act as an accomplice in a relatively
minor role to a murder committed by another; ' a did not act
under duress or domination of another person; 189 did not suffer
from a mental disease or defect causing him to fail to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his conduct to the
190
law;

is not so young as to merit leniency;11 and is likely to

pose a danger to others in the future. 19"
Since the prosecution need not prove the absence of any of
these mitigating factors in order to obtain a conviction for aggravated murder in the first degree, their absence is not an element
of the crime. Although the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors, their judgment need not, and in fact, cannot, rest upon evidence presented
by the state which affirmatively proves the null hypothesis that
such factors do not exist. Even assuming, arguendo, that the
prosecution does have the burden of affirmatively proving the
absence of all mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, the
state would not be shouldering the burden of proving an element of the crime. The crime would already have been proven in
the guilt phase. Assuming the state has the burden of proof on
the issue of sentencing, its burden would be precisely that-to
prove the appropriateness of the requested sentence beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The term "element" is used so commonly in criminal law
that it has nearly escaped definition by appellate courts. It does,
however, have a common definition which focuses on the legal
description of the offense, not a description of the offender.1 93
remains to be seen whether the Washington Supreme Court will adhere to
its prior decision in Bartholomew by grounding its decision in state law rather than federal
law.
186. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.070(2) (1981).
187. Id. § 10.95.070(3).
188. Id. § 10.95.070(4).
189. Id. § 10.95.070(5).
190. Id. § 10.95.070(6).
191. Id. § 10.95.070(7).
192. Id. § 10.95.070(8).
193. In State v. Hook, the Supreme Court of Missouri discussed the term "elements
of the crime" as follows:
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The term "element," as it is commonly referred to in criminal
law, refers to specific historical facts relating to alleged events
which have transpired. Either they have transpired or they have
not. Historical facts do not encompass subjective judgments or
evaluations of offenders to determine if they merit leniency. The
"constituent facts of the offense" of aggravated first degree murder are listed in RCW 10.95.020.194 The absence of "mitigating
However, it is believed that the words "elements of the crime" are used in this
statute as they are commonly used in the field of criminal law. In this field,
when reference is made to the elements of an offense, such reference means the
constituent facts of the offense, the occurrence of which must be alleged and
proved by the state in order to sustain a conviction. All of the elements of an
offense taken together describe and define the crime being considered.
433 S.W. 2d 41, 46 (Mo. App. 1969) (emphasis added).
194. A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits
first degree murder as defined by RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a), as now or hereafter
amended, and one or more of the following aggravating circumstances exist:
(1) The victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, or fire
fighter who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the act
resulting in death and the victim was known or reasonably should have been
known by the person to be such at the time of the killing;
(2) At the time of the act resulting in the death, the person was serving a
term of imprisonment, had escaped, or was on authorized or unauthorized
leave in or from a state facility or program for the incarceration or treatment
of persons adjudicated guilty of crimes;
(3) At the time of the act resulting in death, the person was in custody in a
county or county-city jail as a consequence of having been adjudicated guilty
of a felony;
(4) The person committed the murder pursuant to an agreement that he
or she would receive money or any other thing of value for committing the
murder;
(5) The person solicited another person to commit the murder and had
paid or had agreed to pay money or any other thing of value for committing
the murder;
(6) The victim was:
(a) A judge; juror or former juror; prospective, current, or former witness
in an adjudicative proceeding; prosecuting attorney; deputy prosecuting attorney; defense attorney; a member of the board of prison terms and paroles; or a
probation or parole officer; and
(b) The murder was related to the exercise of official duties performed or
to be performed by the victim;
(7) The person committed the murder to conceal the commission of a
crime or to protect or conceal the identity of any person committing a crime;
(8)There was more than one victim and the murders were part of a common scheme or plan or the result of a single act of the person;
(9) The murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in
immediate flight from one of the following crimes:
(a) Robbery in the first or second degree;
(b) Rape in the first or second degree;
(c) Burglary in the first or second degree;
(d) Kidnaping in the first degree; or
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circumstances meriting leniency" is not listed. Nor is it necessary for the state to prove the absence of mitigating circum195
stances "in order to sustain a conviction. ' '
The state already has a conviction at the end of the guilt
phase. In violation of the Zornes doctrine, RCW 10.95.030 purports to confer upon the prosecutor the option of seeking
harsher punishment based solely upon his subjective conclusion
that this particular case of aggravated first degree murder, as
opposed to other cases, does not warrant leniency. The statute
simply directs the prosecutor to seek the death penalty whenever he feels that a failure to seek the death penalty would be
unwarranted. Failure to impose capital punishment is unwarranted whenever the prosecutor feels that leniency is unwarranted. The statute allows the prosecutor alone to determine
whether the courts will have the possibility of imposing a sentence of death.
The Zornes doctrine distinguishes between judicial discretion to impose different sentences for the same crime, and
prosecutorialdiscretion to subject some, but not all offenders, to
the possibility that the court will impose a harsher sentence.
The Zornes doctrine has no application to judicial sentencing
discretion. In State v. Blanchey,1 " the court explained that as
long as all offenders who commit the same offense are subject to
the same risk of the same range of possible sentences by the
court, there is no equal protection violation.
This distinction between discretion in choosing the degree of
the charge and discretion in fixing the sentence may seem
pointless and can result in petty disputes over language. However, it results from a meeting of our two goals of treating men
equally in the guilt determination process while retaining some
flexibility and individualized treatment at the punishment
9

stage. 1 7

In Olsen v. Delmore, 9 8 the court explained that simply
(e) Arson in the first degree;
(10) The victim was regularly employed or self-employed as a newsreporter and the murder was committed to obstruct or hinder the investigative,
research, or reporting activities of the victim.
WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.020 (1981).
195. Hook, 433 S.W.2d at 46.
196. 75 Wash. 2d 926, 454 P.2d 841 (1969).
197. Id. at 940, 454 P.2d at 850.
198. 48 Wash. 2d 545, 295 P.2d 324 (1956).
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because the legislature vested the court with discretionary power
to impose the alternatives of either incarceration in a penitentiary or confinement in a county jail did not violate equal protection.'9 But the statute struck down in Olsen contained "a
pretty clear indication that the Legislature thereby intended to
to charge as for either
vest in prosecuting officials the discretion
'20 0
felony.'
a
or
misdemeanor
a gross
The judge may constitutionally give different sentences to
defendants who commit the same crime without violating the
rule of Zornes. But the legislature may not empower the prosecutor to place similarly situated people in jeopardy of different
degrees of punishment. It is at this point that the Zornes doctrine intersects the doctrine of separation of powers.
The consequence of granting the prosecutor a veto over a
sentencing alternative is the creation of a system that violates
defendants' rights to equal protection of the law. The separation
of powers doctrine combats the evil of usurpation of the powers
of one branch of government by another. The equal protection
guarantee is designed to secure an impartial and evenhanded
administration of the law. When evaluated from a separation of
powers doctrinal approach, RCW 10.95.030 invades the power of
the judiciary by permitting prosecutors to foreclose a sentencing
option. When evaluated from an equal protection approach,
RCW 10.95.030 deprives a defendant of his right to be treated
like other defendants who have committed the same offense, but
who have not been subjected to a special sentencing proceeding
and the risk of capital punishment.
When the state chooses not to seek the death penalty, the
judicial branch of the government may complain that the defendant in the case at bar is as deserving of capital punishment as
other past defendants who have been subjected to special sentencing proceedings. The court may legitimately complain: Why
not treat this aggravated murder defendant like those others?
When the state chooses to seek the death penalty, the defendant
may complain that he is as deserving of life imprisonment without parole as other past defendants who have not been subjected
to special sentencing proceedings. The defendant may legitimately complain: Why not treat me like those other aggravated
199. Id. at 547-48, 295 P.2d at 325-26.
200. Id. at 548, 295 P.2d at 326 (emphasis added). See also State v. Boggs, 57 Wash.
2d 484, 490, 358 P.2d 124, 128 (1961).
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murder defendants?
Both the Zornes equal protection doctrine and the separation of powers doctrine are based on the underlying assumption
of our criminal justice system that it is the responsibility of the
court, not of the prosecution, to individualize criminal sentences
to make the sentence fit the offender. The prosecution is responsible for deciding which crime fits the defendant's conduct. Once
the prosecution determines which crime to charge, then the
range of potential sentences is legislatively defined. Within that
legislative range of possible sentences, the court chooses the sentence which fits the offender. In this manner, our criminal justice system promotes equality by insisting that all persons who
commit the same offense are subject to the same broad range of
potential punishments. Yet, simultaneously, the system promotes individualized sentencing by allowing the judiciary to
choose a sentence within the legislatively authorized range which
fits the particular defendant before the court.
It is because sentencing is an inherently judicial function
that the Zornes doctrine developed. Adherence to Zornes confines prosecutors to their proper role of making charging decisions, but not sentencing decisions. This interplay between equal
protection doctrine and separation of powers doctrine is best
illustrated by the decision in In re Schellong.20 1
In Schellong, the juvenile defendant was convicted of ten
separate offenses of burglary and theft. At the time of his sentencing, the state relied on nine prior criminal offenses (one felony, seven gross misdemeanors and one misdemeanor) as part of
the juvenile's prior juvenile delinquency record. The defendant
claimed that the prosecutor's discretion to choose between
grouping offenses or counting each offense individually gave the
prosecution the power to subject defendants to different potential maximum punishments for commission of identical crimes in
violation of Zornes.20 '
The supreme court recognized that although the prosecutor
had no power to directly increase the maximum potential punishment for his offenses, the state could indirectly influence the
maximum potential sentence by choosing not to aggregate prior
criminal offenses.20 While acknowledging that this might cause
201. 94 Wash. 2d 314, 616 P.2d 1233 (1980).
202. Id. at 319, 616 P.2d at 1236.

203. Id.
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a Zornes equal protection violation if the prosecutor's acts
caused a mandatory inflation of the sentence, the court noted
that the Juvenile Justice Act contained a "safety valve" permitting the trial judge to override any effect the prosecutor might
have on the recommended sentence.2
The death penalty provisions of RCW 10.95 contain no similar "safety valve." There is no "manifest injustice" provision
that allows the trial judge to override a prosecutor's decision not
to initiate a special sentencing proceeding. The absolute veto
power of the prosecution over capital punishment, immune from
judicial override, thus gives birth to a denial of equal protection.
It produces a legitimate constitutional complaint that the
prosecutorial failure to seek capital punishment in other aggravated first degree murder cases, coupled with the decision to
seek the death penalty against a particular defendant, constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution.
VI.

VOID FOR VAGUENESS

Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that RCW
10.95 does not violate the Zornes doctrine because the prosecution is required to prove the additional element of the absence
of sufficient mitigating circumstances in order to obtain a death
sentence, RCW 10.95 is nevertheless unconstitutionally void for
vagueness. Vague statutes violate due process by encouraging
204. The only effect that the prosecutor can have, under the trial court's interpretation of the statute, is that the suggested sentence under the guidelines
would vary according to whether the prosecutor charges multiple offenses in
groups or all at once. Although this discretion might reach the level of a violation of equal protection if the trial judge were bound to simply follow the
guidelines, just as in Zornes and Olsen the trial judges were bound to sentence

according to the applicable statutes, that is not the case here. The Juvenile

Justice Act of 1977 contains a safety valve which places discretion in the trial
judge and overrides this small amount of discretion that the trial court's interpretation of the statute would place in the prosecutor. The trial judge has the
discretion to impose a sentence outside of the standard range if he finds this is
necessary to avoid "manifest injustice." RCW 13.40.160(4)(c).
Because the trial judge has a discretion in sentencing that can override
any effect that the prosecutor might have on the recommended sentence, this
case falls under the rule of State v. Boggs, 57 Wn.2d 484, 358 P.2d 124
(1961). . . . The trial judge should be able to tailor the sentence to the individual criminal. Thus, there was no denial of equal protection.
Id. at 319-20, 616 P.2d at 1236 (emphasis added).
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arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. In Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville,'" the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a municipal vagrancy statute on grounds of vagueness. The
Supreme Court emphasized that where "there are no standards
governing the exercise of discretion granted by the ordinance,
the scheme permits and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.""
The ordinance, according to one scholar, "had to be invalidated because its vagueness permitted and encouraged arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. The ordinance was so vague
that the arresting officers had hardly any guidance from it. ''2 a7
The Washington Supreme Court, in City of Seattle v.
Rice,20 8 struck down a municipal trespass ordinance which
criminalized the act of refusing to leave premises open to the
public when given a "lawful order" to leave:
[A] statute or ordinance must be sufficiently specific to ensure
that it will not be enforced arbitrarily. A vague statute or ordinance invites unequal enforcement, and gives unfettered discretion to the police and to the Courts. By defining the offense
of criminal trespass in terms of obedience to a "lawful" order,
the Seattle ordinance creates the possibility of arbitrary
enforcement. As we stated in Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wn.2d 539,
545, 536 P.2d 603 (1975):
"Legislation which purports to define illegality by resort to
such inherently subjective terms as 'unlawful purpose'. . . permits, indeed requires, an ad hoc police determination of criminality.... The potential for arbitrary and discriminatory law
enforcement under such legislation cannot constitutionally be
tolerated.""
Like the standardless statutes in Papachristouand Rice,21 0
the failure to define the terms "mitigating circumstances" or
"merits leniency" renders RCW 10.95 unconstitutionally
vague
by inviting arbitrary ad hoc prosecutorial determination of when
to request capital punishment. The prosecution is directed to
seek the death penalty "when there is reason to believe that
there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leni205. 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
206. Id. at 170.
207. K. DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRAnSE, § 3.9, at 180 (1979).
208. 93 Wash. 2d 728, 612 P.2d 792 (1980).
209. Id. at 732, 612 P.2d at 794 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
210. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
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ency.' ' 2 11 The statute thus poses four issues for prosecutorial resolution in every case: (1) What constitutes a mitigating circumstance? (2) How strong must the mitigating circumstances be
before they are "sufficient" to merit leniency? (3) Do there exist
mitigating circumstances in this case which merit leniency? (4)
Notwithstanding the existence of mitigating circumstances
which, in the prosecutor's judgment do merit leniency, is there
nevertheless "a reason to believe" that the mitigating circumstances are not sufficient?
The language of the statute appeals directly to personal,
subjective feelings. The decision turns on belief, and not on evidence, proof, or findings. The judgment called for is not directed
or guided in any way. What is "sufficient," "mitigating," or
"meritorious"? The statutory language does not say. But the legislature has provided no other guidelines. Absent guidance, the
decision becomes an exercise in unfettered discretion, where
every prosecuting attorney in the State of Washington is free to
act in accordance with his or her own personal beliefs.
A.

Mitigating Circumstance

If the prosecutor is to determine that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, he must be
able to distinguish a mitigating circumstance from other "neutral" circumstances. What is a mitigating circumstance? Is poverty a mitigating circumstance? Is the lack of employment
opportunities a mitigating circumstance? Is the fact that the
defendant is an immigrant who came to this country with meager employment skills and a poor command of the English language a mitigating circumstance? The Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney may feel in his heart that this is a mitigating
circumstance. The King County Prosecuting Attorney may disagree. An Asian-American prosecuting attorney may feel that a
teenage immigrant to this country from Hong Kong has a claim
of mitigating circumstances but an Anglo-American prosecuting
attorney who has no personal experience with the social impact
of immigration may disagree.
Is it a mitigating circumstance that the accused has, notwithstanding this commission of an aggravated murder, acquired
a reputation of being unusually generous and charitable to other
211. WAsH. Rgv. CODE § 10.95.040(1) (1981).
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members of the community? Is it a mitigating circumstance that
the defendant has worked to single-handedly support his family
of five brothers and sisters and his parents?
The statute provides no definition of the term "mitigating
circumstance." The closest the statute comes to a discussion of
mitigating circumstances is contained in RCW 10.95.070.212 This
section does not speak of mitigating circumstances as such, but
instead permits jury consideration of "any relevant factors." The
factors listed do not all militate in favor of leniency. The last
relevant factor concerns the question of "whether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to others in the
future." Presumably an affirmative answer to this question militates against leniency. Although some of the factors listed in
RCW 10.95.070 could be taken as mitigating circumstances,
neither the prosecuting attorney nor the jury is told why these
factors qualify as mitigating factors. Since the list is expressly
stated to be only illustrative, the statute conveys that there are
other relevant factors, yet no legislative directive tells how to
determine if these other relevant factors qualify as "mitigating
circumstances."
If the underlying truth is that anything may be a mitigating
circumstance, then RCW 10.95 is completely standardless, and
the statute fails to "'guide' and 'regularize' the discretion of the
sentencing jury and [to] make the process of sentencing to death
'rationally reviewable.' " In Gregg v. Georgia, " the defendant
argued that the statutory definitions of some of the aggravation
factors under Georgia law "were vague and therefore susceptible
of widely differing interpretations creating a substantial risk
that the death penalty would be arbitrarily inflicted."2 15 The
U.S. Supreme Court initially rejected this argument, based on
the assumption that the Georgia Supreme Court could, through
judicial interpretation, narrow the scope of vague statutory defi2 1 the
nitions. But in Godfrey v. Georgia,
Court said:
[1]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a
constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a
manner that avoids the arbitraryand capricious infliction of
the death penalty. Part of a State's responsibility in this
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. § 10.95.070.
Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d at 192, 654 P.2d at 1182.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 202.
446 U.S. 420 (1980).
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regard is to define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates "standardless [sentencing] discretion." It must channel the sentencer's discretion by "clear and
objective standards" that provide "specific and detailed guidreviewable the process for
ance" and that "make rationally
17
2
imposing a sentence of death."

In the case of Washington's death penalty statute, the constitutional defect concerns the failure to define "mitigating circumstances." In Godfrey, the defect was the failure to constitutionally "tailor" the vague definition of an aggravating
circumstance.' 1 8 In both cases, however, the evil to be prevented
is the same: standardless sentencing discretion must be eliminated. The Washington statute fails to channel both the prosecutor's discretion to request the death penalty and the jury's
discretion to grant his request, by failing to supply "clear and

the "specific and detailed
objective standards" which provide
21 9

guidance" mandated by Godfrey.
2 20 the Illinois
In People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham,
Supreme Court examined the Illinois death penalty statute
217. Id. at 428 (quoting Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d at 189, 654 P.2d at 1180)

(emphasis added).
218. 446 U.S. at 428-29.
219. Id. at 428. In Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2741-44 (1983), a majority of
the Supreme Court concluded that aggravating circumstances serve simply to define the
threshhold which distinguishes cases of murder where capital punishment is unavailable
from those where a death sentence is available. As long as the aggravating factors are
defined with sufficient clarity, the Zant Court concluded it was not necessary that the
jury be instructed that it should weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in order to satisfy the eighth amendment requirement that a death penalty
scheme must adequately channel the discretion of the sentencing body.
The Zant dissenters noted that the majority was effectively abandoning its prior
decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 198 (1976), where it was held that capital
punishment discretion was "to be exercised by clear and objective standards." Justice
Marshall, dissenting, observed:
Under today's decision all the State has to do is require the jury to make some
threshhold finding. Once that finding is made, the jurors can be left completely
at large, with nothing to guide them but their whims and prejudices. They
need not even consider any statutory aggravating circumstances that they have
found to be applicable. Their sentencing decision is to be the product of their
discretion and of nothing else.
103 S. Ct. at 2760 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
While the Zant majority has determined that the absence of channeled discretion,
after making a threshhold finding, does not violate the eighth amendment, that determination does not dictate the answer to the question of whether or not a state may fail to
adequately define an element of a statutory offense, in violation of the vagueness doctrine under the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
220. 61 Ill. 2d 353, 336 N.E.2d 1 (1973).
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which directed a panel of three judges to decide whether "there
are compelling reasons for mercy" 221 such that the death sentence should not be imposed. The Cunningham court concluded:
[Tihe provision is defective because it does not contain standards or guidelines to be considered in determining whether
there are "compelling reasons for mercy" 222
and the imposing of a
sentence other than a sentence of death.

The two phrases "compelling reasons for mercy" and "sufficient mitigating circumstances meriting leniency" are equally
vacuous. Both are equally unconstitutionally vague.
B.

Sufficient to Merit Leniency

Are some mitigating circumstances more meritorious than
others, or do all mitigating circumstances contribute equally to
the "leniency" calculation? Is the youth of a defendant a more
powerful reason for leniency than a defendant's lack of a significant history of prior criminal activity? Does the existence of a
lengthy juvenile history of prior criminal activity "negate" the
mitigating force of a defendant's relative youth so as to make
leniency unwarranted? The statutes do not answer these questions. Assuming that all mitigating circumstances are equally
meritorious, how many mitigating circumstances are required
before leniency is merited? Is one enough? Will the jury infer
from the use of the plural (in the phrase "mitigating circumstances") that at least two mitigating circumstances are
required? Does it depend upon how many aggravating factors
were proved at stage one? If three aggravating factors are
proved, must the jury be able to articulate at least three mitigating circumstances to counterbalance them?
The statute provides no guidance whatsoever as to how
much mitigation is required before leniency is merited. The statutory term "sufficient" is left undefined and every prosecutor
and juror is free to follow his or her own personal feelings. One
jury may find it "sufficient" that a defendant is twenty-three
years old, notwithstanding the fact that he raped and murdered
a dozen kindergarteners. For the same crime another jury might
find it insufficient to merit leniency that the twenty-three year
old defendant had a history of schizophrenia, no prior criminal
221. Id. at 361-62, 336 N.E.2d at 6.
222. Id.
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record, an I.Q. of sixty-five, and that he committed the crime
under the direction of an older defendant with ten prior felony
convictions.
The statute's failure to define "sufficiency" is hardly an
insurmountable legislative barrier. Many states simply require
that the jury be convinced that there are no mitigating circumstances present. The Washington death penalty statute provides
that the presence of just one aggravating factor is sufficient for
the imposition of capital punishment. The statute could easily
quantify the number of mitigating circumstances necessary to
merit leniency, but it fails to do so.
C. The Prosecutor's "Reason to Believe"
The prosecutorial decision to request death is also intertwined with an additional thread of unfettered discretion. The
prosecution is directed to request a death sentence whenever the
prosecutor has "reason to believe" that there are not sufficient
mitigating circumstances (as defined by the prosecutor). In contrast to the question put to the jury, requiring them to find-in
the plural-mitigating circumstances, the prosecution need only
have one "reason to believe" that capital punishment is appropriate. Thus, notwithstanding the presence of five or ten identifiable mitigating circumstances, if the prosecutor believes that in
cases of multiple homicides no number of mitigating circumstances can be sufficient for leniency, then that one "reason" is
sufficient to put the question of capital punishment before the
jury.
Nor does the statute require the prosecutor to record that
reason, or to articulate in any manner his justification for
requesting capital punishment. No affidavit must be filed with
the court which specifies the state's reason.
The failure to require the prosecutor to articulate the basis
of his "reason to believe" that capital punishment is warranted
constitutes a violation of procedural due process which further
aggravates the statute's unconstitutional vagueness. The U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently held that the fundamental
requirements of procedural due process guarantee citizens the
right to an explanation when governmental officials take action
that adversely affects them. One scholar has noted that this
right "has often been valued less for its own sake than as a
device for the protection of substantive rights or entitle-
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ments." 2 ' In Wolff v. McDonnell,2 2 the Supreme Court
required that a denial of parole be accompanied by a written
statement of reasons. "The provision for a written record helps
to insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by
[other] officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts,
where fundamental constitutional rights may have been
225
abridged, will act fairly.
A welfare administrator who denies an applicant public
assistance is required, as a matter of constitutional law, to "state
the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he
relied on . . . though the statement need not amount to a full
opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of
law. '2 2 ' But RCW 10.95.040 does not require a prosecutor to
state his reason for requesting the death penalty. 227 The law
thus requires less for a prosecutor to put a man on trial for his
life than it does for an. administrator to turn down a request for
food stamps.
The requirement of an explanation of reasons is designed to
test the fairness of administrative decisionmaking by subjecting
it to public scrutiny. Here the legislature has purported to vest
total, unrestrained discretion in the prosecutor to seek or not to
seek capital punishment, in cases where individuals have committed the same offense, without defining the statutory terms
upon which the decision turns. As a final constitutional flaw, the
legislature does not even require the prosecution to explain its
decision. The prosecution is free to define "mitigating circumstances" as it chooses, to assess their sufficiency by purely personal and subjective standards, and then may announce its decision to request a sentence of death, without providing any
explanation as to how this conclusion was reached. The failure
to require an explanation thus aggravates the other constitutional defects which so thoroughly pervade RCW 10.95.
223. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10-15, at 554 (1978).
224. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
225. Id. at 565.
226. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
227. If a person is charged with aggravated first degree murder as defined by
RCW 10.95.020, the prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of a special
sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should
be imposed when there is reason to believe that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency.
WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.040(1) (1981).
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UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

2 8
In Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 2

the court adopted a two-part test to determine whether a delegation of legislative authority is constitutional. The delegation of
power will be upheld where it can be shown "(1) that the Legislature has provided standards or guidelines which define in general terms what is to be done and the instrumentality or administrative body which is to accomplish it; and (2) that procedural
safeguards exist to control arbitrary administrative
action and
''229
any administrative abuse of discretionary power.
RCW 10.95.040 may be deemed to satisfy the first prong of
the Barry test. The statute does state generally what is to be
done and who is to do it. The prosecuting attorney is assigned
the general task of determining whether or not capital punishment should be requested. But the statute fails to satisfy the
second prong of the Barry test since there are no procedural
safeguards which exist to prevent the prosecution from making
an arbitrary decision to request a death sentence.
It must be clearly understood that the procedural safeguards required by Barry are designed to prevent an arbitrary
prosecutorial decision to file a notice of a special sentencing proceeding. The decision is not the decision to impose a death sentence. That decision is within the province of the jury, and the
delegation of legislative powers doctrine is not applicable to it.
The decision subject to Barry is the decision to trigger a special
sentencing proceeding.
First, it must be noted that the prosecutors could adopt
their own standards to guide their decisions. The Washington
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of administrative prosecutorial standards:
The employment of standards to guide a prosecutorial decision
minimizes the possibility that the State will act arbitrarily in
violation of the due process rights of defendants. 80
In State v. Rowe,"81 the court approved of the use of objective standards by a prosecutor in deciding whether to charge a
228. 81 Wash. 2d 155, 500 P.2d 540 (1972).
229. Id. at 159, 500 P.2d at 542-43 (emphasis deleted). Accord, Polygon Corporation
v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 66, 578 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1978).
230. Cascade, 94 Wash. 2d at 779, 621 P.2d at 119.
231. 93 Wash. 2d 277, 609 P.2d 1348 (1980).
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defendant with being an habitual criminal. If the Washington
county prosecutors had self-imposed administrative standards
which guided the decision to seek or not to seek capital punishment, then there would exist administrative procedural safeguards against arbitrary decision making. But no such safeguards exist.28 2
Nor are there any procedures adopted which ensure that
evidence of mitigating factors will be presented or considered.
The police are not directed to look for any mitigating evidence.
The statute does not require the prosecuting attorney to make
any effort to seek out mitigating circumstances, and the King
County Prosecutor's standards do not either. The statute places
a limit of thirty days from the time of arraignment during which
the prosecutor may consider filing notice of a special sentencing
proceeding. But the statute does not direct or require the prosecutor to take action within these thirty days.
Nothing prevents the prosecutor from filing the notice of
special sentencing proceeding at the time of arraignment itself.
The prosecutor can, if he chooses, make no effort to identify
mitigating circumstances. He may simply assume there are none.
Neither the statute nor King County Prosecutor filing standards
provide a mechanism for defense counsel to make an offer of
proof to the prosecutor as to mitigating circumstances.
It is not a sufficient answer to argue that the prosecutor's
discretion is restricted by his ability to meet the standard of
proof required, because the proof required is undefined and nonexistent. The prosecution must prove that something the legislature has not defined does not exist. Even assuming that an oper232. The King County Prosecuting Attorney does have a written death penalty standard. Until April, 1983, the standard provided no more guidance than does the statute.
The King County Prosecutor's former filing standards did not narrow the discretion
granted by WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.040 by adopting specific guidelines: they simply
repeated the general language of the statute.
In April, 1983, the King County Prosecutor promulgated new guidelines for deciding
when to file notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Norm Maleng, Filing and Disposition Policies, Criminal Division [King County Prosecutor], (April 21, 1983). Under the
new guidelines, the prosecuting attorney must be satisfied that substantial evidence
exists to establish premeditation and an aggravating factor. Id. at 40. The decision to file
is made when the prosecuting attorney has decided that there is not sufficient evidence
of mitigation to warrant less than the death penalty. Id. The prosecutor's file must contain aggravating factors, mitigating factors existing under WASH. REV. CODE §
10.95.040(1), Id at 41, and other mitigating factors. Id. The Chief Deputy shall also seek
input from defense counsel and note it in the file. Id. As of October, 1983, no death
penalty cases have been filed under the new standard.
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ational definition of mitigating circumstances existed, to assert a
good faith belief that the state could meet its burden of proof,
the prosecuting attorney need only close his or her eyes and
utter the words, "I don't see any mitigating circumstances." The
state need only assert the nonexistence of facts. It need not
attempt to determine whether critical mitigating facts do exist.
Once the notice of a special sentencing proceeding is filed, it is
too late for the defendant to do anything about it.
In the past, the King County Prosecutor's Office has
asserted that the existence of disciplinary rules and ethical standards constitute "procedural safeguards" which satisfy the second prong of the Barry test.23 3 The state has further argued that
Disciplinary Rule 7-103(A) of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility 2 4 prohibits a prosecutor from instituting a criminal charge unsupported by probable cause.23 5 It is difficult to
take this argument seriously. Does the state really mean to suggest that the threat of a disciplinary proceeding against a county
prosecutor will prevent arbitrary decisions? Will bar disciplinary
committees investigate the good faith of county prosecutors who
assert their own subjective belief that capital punishment is warranted in a particular case? Where the decision is so purely subjective and the criteria so completely undefined, there is no
meaning to a phrase like "probable cause." One man's honest
subjective belief that death is appropriate may strike another
equally honest man as absurd. "Probable cause" to believe a
crime has been committed is tested by reference to the concrete
factual elements of a crime. But how does one assess "probable
cause" to believe that leniency is not warranted because undefined mitigating circumstances have never surfaced?
As stated in State v. Cascade District Court:
The separation of powers principle requires that the delegation
of legislative power to the executive be accomplished along
with standards which guide and restrain the exercise of the
delegated authority. If the Legislature wishes to make the initial eligibility decision one for the prosecutor, as in California
233. State v. Hughes, No. 82-1-01979-4 (King County Super. Ct., Mar. 12, 1983),
appeal filed, No. 49493 (Wash. S. Ct., April 14, 1983).
234. "A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to
be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not
supported by probable cause." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY DR 7103(A) (1981).
235. Hughes, No. 82-1-01979-4.
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and New Jersey, then standards for guiding decisionmaking are
necessary to prevent an unconstitutional delegation of the leg26
islative authority to alter the sentencing process. "
No procedural safeguards exist to guard against arbitrary
prosecutorial decisionmaking. Neither the legislature nor the
county prosecutors have devised any such safeguards. Accordingly, RCW 10.95 must be held, as applied in King County and
other counties, to confer an unconstitutional grant of legislative
power upon the executive branch of government.

VIII.

THE UNEQUAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW

Where a grant of discretionary power is exercised according
to the personal whims of an administrator, rather than in accordance with an ascertainable legal standard, the result is the
denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. The fuzzier the legal standard, the more
susceptible the administration of law becomes to personal
caprices. In the seminal case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,3 7 the
Supreme Court held that though a law be "fair on its face and
impartial in appearance," yet if applied and administered with
"an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances," the
guarantee of equal protection of the law is unconstitutionally
abridged. 28 The Court recognized that the equal protection
clause is rooted in the doctrine that ours is a government of
laws, not of men:
When we consider the nature of the theory of our institutions
of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to
rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for
the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.
...For the very idea that one man may be compelled to
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails,
as being the essence of slavery itself.'8 9
Recent experience with the death penalty in Washington
236.
237.
238.
239.

94 Wash. 2d at 781, 621 P.2d at 120 (citations omitted).
118 US. 356 (1886).
Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 369-70 (emphasis added).
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State reflects a chilling pattern of drastically unequal administration of the law. In Snohomish County, in the case against
defendant Charles Campbell, ' 0 the prosecuting attorney officially acknowledged the receipt of a petition containing
thousands of signatures, calling on the prosecutor to seek the
death penalty.2 41 The prosecutor placed the petition in his
official file and ultimately sought the death penalty. 24 2 In King
County, when labor reform leaders were gunned down by hired
killers, the Asian community asked the prosecutor not to seek
the death penalty against codefendants Ramil and Guloy. 243 In
that case, the absence of political pressure to seek capital punishment, coupled with the presence of political pressure not to
seek a death sentence, may have produced a decision not to initiate death penalty proceedings.
The presence or absence of petition signatures or vocal community expressions of sentiment is completely unrelated to the
statutory directive to consider whether mitigating circumstances
meriting leniency are present. But because the statute is so completely devoid of any meaningful standards, the county prosecutors throughout the state are left highly vulnerable to the influence of political pressures. The upshot may well be an emerging
pattern of executions according to prevailing local community
standards. Where local community sentiment in favor of capital
punishment runs high, prosecutors will seek death sentences
more frequently than those whose communities are characterized by philosophical objections to capital punishment. The
result is the haphazard infliction of death across the state. The
executioner's song will play in Yakima County, but for an identical crime, it may not play in Kitsap County.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The interlocking threads of various constitutional defects in
the statutory scheme of RCW 10.95 reinforce each other repeatedly. By vesting sole authority in the prosecution to initiate a
death penalty proceeding, the legislature has granted prosecu240. State v. Campbell, No. 82-1-00241-5 (Snohomish County Super. Ct., Nov. 30,
1982), appeal filed, No. 49244 (Wash. S. Ct., Dec. 21, 1982).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. State v. Ramil, No. 81-1-01924-9 (King County Super. Ct., Sept. 24, 1981),
appeal filed, No. 48311-6 (Wash. S. Ct., Jan. 16, 1981), appeal filed sub. nom. State v.
Guloy, No. 48248-9 (Sept. 18, 1981).

1984]

Standardless Death Penalty Policies

353

tors an unconstitutional veto power over a sentencing alternative, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The systematic failure to seek input from the lay community by
ignoring the institution of the grand jury compounds the problem by leaving the power of the prosecutor unchecked. By
authorizing prosecutors to seek different degrees of punishment,
even though defendants have committed identical crimes, the
legislature has sanctioned a violation of equal protection principles. Simultaneously, the absence of legislative standards or definitions leaves county prosecutors free to legislate their own
death penalty schemes, in violation of the due process vagueness
principles. A legislative delegation of such enormous power,
without guiding standards, permits intolerable variances
between capital punishment practices from one county to the
next. While discretion is permissible, the exercise of sound discretion demands responsibility. The defects in RCW 10.95 fail to
ensure that sentences of death are responsibly administered in
Washington State.

